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INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 2005, the world mourned the death of the servant of God,
Karol Wojtyla, who as Pope John Paul II served for twenty-six years as the
Bishop of Rome and Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church. Many popular
commentators saw in his passing the death of a “world leader,” a figure who
loomed large on the diplomatic stage, a champion of the cause of peace, and a
man who played a significant role in helping to bring about the downfall of
Communism in his native Poland and throughout Central and Eastern Europe.1
While history will surely acknowledge John Paul’s involvement in world
events, these descriptions fail to capture the essence of the man and his life,
namely, that of being a disciple of Jesus Christ. Like all Christian disciples
since the twelve apostles, he fervently sought, through word and example, to
share the Gospel with those around him. Thus, in the death of John Paul II, the
world saw the passing of one of the great witnesses to the Christian faith.2
In virtually every aspect of his ministry as Peter’s successor, John Paul
worked to overcome the tumult and confusion that defined the immediate postconciliar era by bringing to the Church and the world an authentic
understanding of the Second Vatican Council.3 Indeed, the major themes of

1. See, e.g., JOHN O’SULLIVAN, THE PRESIDENT, THE POPE, AND THE PRIME MINISTER:
THREE WHO CHANGED THE WORLD (2006) (discussing the efforts of Ronald Reagan, Pope John
Paul II, and Margaret Thatcher to end Communism); David Remnick, John Paul II, NEW
YORKER, Apr. 11, 2005, at 21–23 (describing John Paul largely in terms of his opposition to
world Communism).
2. For a thorough account of the late Holy Father’s life and work, see GEORGE WEIGEL,
WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II (1999). In addition to his
extraordinary record of formal teaching, discussed infra, John Paul’s love for Christ and thus his
witness to the Christian faith can be seen most vividly and dramatically in his act of forgiveness
and reconciliation with his would-be assassin, Mehmet Ali Agca, see id. at 412–14, and his public
suffering and death from Parkinson’s disease and other ailments.
3. See, e.g., Tracey Rowland, Reclaiming the Tradition: John Paul II as the Authentic
Interpreter of Vatican II, in JOHN PAUL THE GREAT: MAKER OF THE POST-CONCILIAR CHURCH
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John Paul’s pontificate gave concrete expression to many of the themes of the
Council itself. This can be seen in his efforts to “confirm the brethren in the
faith”4 by providing the faithful with a sound basis for a correct understanding
of Christian doctrine and practice;5 in his efforts to ensure observation of the
Christian Sabbath6 and prayerful celebration of the sacraments including,
preeminently, the Eucharist;7 in his outreach to the Jewish people and his
(William Oddie ed., 2005); DAVID L. SCHINDLER, HEART OF THE WORLD, CENTER OF THE
CHURCH: COMMUNIO ECCLESIOLOGY, LIBERALISM, AND LIBERATION 30 (1996) (arguing that
John Paul’s communio ecclesiology represents the authentic teaching of Vatican II); Richard John
Neuhaus, Rome Diary: April 11: Remembering John Paul II, FIRST THINGS, June/July 2005, at
58, 62 (“Among the many achievements of the pontificate of John Paul II, some would say the
most important achievement, was to secure the hermeneutic for the interpretation of that great
council.”).
4. Luke 22:23.
5. POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION Fidei Depositum (1992) (marking the
publication of the Catechism of the Catholic Church), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_
father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_19921011_fidei-depositum_
en.html.
6. POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER Dies Domini (1998) (on keeping the Lord’s
Day holy), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/
hf_jp-ii_apl_05071998_dies-domini_en.html.
7. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Ecclesia de Eucharistia (2003) (on the
Eucharist in its relationship to the Church), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
special_features/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_20030417_ecclesia_eucharistia_en.html;
POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER Mane Nobiscum Domine (2004) (reflecting on the Year
of the Eucharist), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/
documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_20041008_mane-nobiscum-domine_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II,
APOSTOLIC LETTER Misericordia Dei (2002) (on the sacrament of reconciliation), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-ii_motu-proprio_
20020502_misericordia-dei_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION Familiaris
Consortio (1981) (on Christian marriage and the family in the modern world), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_1981
122familiaris-consortio_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, LETTER TO FAMILIES Gratissimam Sane
(1994) (reflecting on the Year of the Family), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_02021994_families_en.html.
The intimate connection between the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist was a
theme that John Paul addressed at the very beginning of his pontificate. See POPE JOHN PAUL II,
ENCYCLICAL LETTER Redemptor Hominis, para. 20 (1979) [hereinafter Redemptor Hominis],
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_
04031979_redemptor-hominis_en.html; see also CONGREGATION FOR DIVINE WORSHIP AND THE
DISCIPLINE OF SACRAMENTS, INSTRUCTION ON THE USE OF VERNACULAR LANGUAGES IN THE
PUBLICATION OF THE BOOKS OF THE ROMAN LITURGY Liturgiam Authenticam (2001), available
at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_doc_2001
0507_liturgiam-authenticam_en.html; CONGREGATION FOR DIVINE WORSHIP AND THE
DISCIPLINE OF SACRAMENTS, INSTRUCTION ON CERTAIN MATTERS TO BE OBSERVED OR TO BE
AVOIDED REGARDING THE MOST HOLY EUCHARIST Redemptionis Sacramentum (2004),
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_
doc_20040423_redemptionis-sacramentum_en.html.
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sorrow to God for the sins committed in the name of Christ and his Church;8 in
his untiring work to secure human dignity through the recognition of human
rights including the right to life9 and the right to religious freedom;10 in his
ecumenical efforts to achieve genuine unity among all the separated followers
of Christ;11 in his work on behalf of inter-religious dialogue;12 and in his
challenge to the cultural and intellectual malaise of modern society.13 In
pursuing these themes, the late Pope put to good use his stunning intellect, his

8. See generally JOHN PAUL II IN THE HOLY LAND: IN HIS OWN WORDS (Lawrence Boadt,
CSP & Kevin di Camillo eds., 2005) (collection of homilies, prayers, and addresses of John Paul
II during his trip to Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel, including his address at Yad Vashem and
his prayer at the Western Wall); LUIGI ACCATTOLI, WHEN A POPE ASKS FORGIVENESS (Jordan
Aumann trans., 1998) (collection of prayers and addresses by John Paul which seek forgiveness
for the sins of Christians). For a thoughtful essay on the proper interpretation of John Paul’s
statements regarding forgiveness, see Mary Ann Glendon, Contrition in the Age of Spin Control,
FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1997, at 10. See also The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, FIRST
THINGS, May 1998, at 39 (setting forth the text of the Holy See’s Commission for Religious
Relations with the Jews, We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, as well as the text of John
Paul II’s letter to Edward Cardinal Cassidy, the head of the Commission).
9. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Evangelium Vitae (1995) [hereinafter
Evangelium Vitae] (addressing the threats to human life presented by legal abortion, euthanasia,
and capital punishment), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/
documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html.
10. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations
Organization (Oct. 5, 1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/
speeches/1995/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_05101995_address-to-uno_en.html; Pope John
Paul II, On the Value and Content of Freedom of Conscience and of Religion (Sept. 1, 1980),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/pont_messages/1980/
documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19800901_helsinki-act_en.html; Pope John Paul II, Address of His
Holiness John Paul II to the 34th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 2,
1979), in PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF THE HOLY SEE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PATHS
TO PEACE: A CONTRIBUTION: DOCUMENTS OF THE HOLY SEE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY 16, 23–24 (Liturgical Publications, Inc. 1987).
11. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Ut Unum Sint (1995) [hereinafter Ut Unum
Sint] (on the Church’s commitment to ecumenism), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25051995_ut-unum-sint_en.html.
12. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Address to the Representatives of the Christian Churches
and Ecclesial Communities and of the World Religions (Oct. 27, 1986), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1986/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_
19861027_prayer-peace-assisi-final_en.html; see also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON THE UNICITY AND SALVIFIC UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS CHRIST AND
THE CHURCH Dominus Iesus (2000) (rejecting the purported identification of other religions with
Christianity and the claim that there is salvation outside of the redemption won by Christ),
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_
doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html.
13. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Fides et Ratio (1998) [hereinafter Fides et
Ratio], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio_en.html.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

JOHN PAUL II, THE STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE LIMITS OF LAW

321

gift for oratory and flair for the dramatic, and his warm touch as a dedicated
pastor and true spiritual father. Thus, it is no surprise that, even before his
death, some began to refer to the Pope, without exaggeration, as “John Paul the
Great.” 14
Although the late Pontiff was not a lawyer, his writings on the purpose and
nature of law are quite substantial. Indeed, even a cursory examination of the
contents of the rich pontificate just ended shows that this is an enormous topic.
Throughout his numerous encyclicals, apostolic exhortations and letters,
homilies, and addresses, the late Holy Father was a passionate defender of both
democracy and the rule of law.15 In the exercise of his teaching office, John
Paul self-consciously sought to recover an authentic understanding of law, an
understanding that had been obscured by the distorted notion of autonomy
embraced by the liberal democracies of the West and lost in the tragic
disregard for the individual that typified the legal regimes of countries under
socialism.16 John Paul’s teaching concerning the relationship between
freedom, truth, and law is especially noteworthy in this regard.17
Part of the intellectual work that must be performed in every discipline is
the work of circumscribing the limits of the discipline itself. Indeed, in order
to carry the discipline forward, it is vitally important to know what lies within
its boundaries and what exceeds them. The same can be said of the terms and
definitions that make up the conceptual framework within a given field of
study. That is, in order to understand a particular concept, it is necessary to be

14. In 1997, somewhat audaciously, CRISIS magazine featured a picture of John Paul on its
cover with this honorific. See CRISIS, Nov. 1997. While some doubt whether John Paul is truly
deserving of the title, see, for example, Susan A. Ross & Robert Louis Wilken, A Measure of
Greatness—The Papacy of John Paul II: Two Assessments, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 10, 2003,
referring to the late Pontiff in this manner has become common place. See, e.g., PEGGY
NOONAN, JOHN PAUL THE GREAT: REMEMBERING A SPIRITUAL FATHER (2005). Indeed, Pope
Benedict XVI routinely refers to his beloved predecessor in this fashion. See Ian Fisher,
Cardinals Choose a Close Aid to John Paul II to Lead Church, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2005.
15. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION Ecclesia in
America, para. 19 (1999) (applauding the “growing support for democratic political systems” in
the Americas but insisting that “[t]here can be no rule of law . . . unless citizens and especially
leaders are convinced that there is no freedom without truth”), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_22011999_ecclesia-inamerica_en.html.
16. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Centesimus Annus, para. 47 (1991)
[hereinafter Centesimus Annus], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY
HERITAGE 439 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) [hereinafter CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT] (“Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the
basis of a correct conception of the human person.”), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_
father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html.
17. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Veritatis Splendor, paras. 35–53 (1993)
[hereinafter Veritatis Splendor], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

322

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:317

able to identify that to which it refers, as well as that to which it does not.
Because law is a normative discipline, its boundaries are not merely
conceptual. They are also prudential.
The topic I wish to explore in the essay that follows is how John Paul II
helped to perform this important task with respect to law. He reminded us of
the limits of law, of what exceeds the competence of juridical authority.
Briefly put, the law may be employed as a means of eliminating or reforming
the systemic defects or problems in society that the late pontiff referred to as
“structures of sin,” but because it cannot reach the recesses of the human heart,
law is severely limited in bringing about true social transformation.18 Where
the ambitions behind a given statute or judicial opinion go beyond law’s
capacity to achieve justice and promote the common good, modesty dictates a
different course. To put the matter in a slightly different fashion, John Paul’s
thought helped to identify the somewhat nebulous line where law ends and
society begins. In doing so, John Paul contributed to the long tradition of
reflection on the meaning of “culture” and its relationship to law found in the
Catholic intellectual tradition in general and the Church’s social teaching in
particular. For reasons that I hope will be clear, the place I wish to begin this
examination of John Paul’s work is not with a close study of one of his many
magisterial texts, but with a passage from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers
Karamazov.19 Indeed, this remarkable passage succinctly captures many of the
central tenets of modern Catholic social thought, including the work of John
Paul II.
Furthermore, in a recent article, David Skeel and William Stuntz argue in
favor of legal modesty, a virtue that they say coincides with the understanding
of law that emerges from a correct reading of the Christian Bible.20 Arguing
from an Evangelical perspective, they contend that the law is ill-suited to
address a number of social ills to which it is frequently directed, including,
conspicuously, the problem of abortion.21 They criticize the practice of
enacting merely symbolic laws, a vice they term “legal moralism.”22 Because
these sorts of laws are seldom enforced, they cannot teach the public the values
that they purportedly embody.23 Moreover, because these laws often take the

18. See infra Part II.
19. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Andrew H. MacAndrew trans.,
Bantam Books, 1981) (1880).
20. David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 813 (2006) (“If our society is to recover the rule of law, it must be a more
modest law that rules.”); id. at 815 (“These Biblical principles lead, in other words, to the same
rule-of-law principles that our legal system purports to honor.”).
21. Id. at 831–39.
22. Id. at 832.
23. Id. at 836 n.117.
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form of extensive moral codes, they undermine the rule of law as a whole by
vesting an inordinate amount of discretion in the hands of public officials.24
A great deal of Skeel and Stuntz’s argument coincides with what John Paul
had to say about the limits of law. Nevertheless, their reflections would have
benefited from a fuller engagement with the Christian intellectual tradition,
including the social magisterium of John Paul II. In the essay that follows I
hope to show first, with respect to abortion, that Skeel and Stuntz fail to make
the case that a concern for legal modesty should trump a concern for the
protection of unborn human life. Put another way, Skeel and Stuntz fail to
demonstrate that the value of prudence for safeguarding the integrity of the
rule of law should outweigh the pursuit of justice, properly understood.
Second, I shall argue that, contrary to Skeel and Stuntz’s assertions, antiabortion laws are not merely symbolic. Indeed, the available evidence
indicates that various kinds of restrictions have been effective in curbing the
frequency of abortion.25 Third and finally, I shall argue that Skeel and Stuntz
fail to fully appreciate the different ways in which law effectively instructs
those who are subject to it. Indeed, as the late Pope well knew, a particular law
can serve a vital teaching function that goes beyond the specific instances in
which it is enforced. In this way, the law can reaffirm the values already
present in a given culture and so reinforce the non-legal norms operating
within it.
I. FATHER ZOSIMA AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
John Paul’s views on the limits of law—of the inability of law to serve as
the primary vehicle for truly profound social change—are beautifully captured
in a passage from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.26 Although
Dostoevsky was an Orthodox Christian whose criticism and Russian suspicion
of the Roman Catholic Church appear throughout his novels, he is in many
ways a deeply Catholic writer. The themes he explores—themes of suffering,
mercy, and redemption, of the wretched nature of the human condition, and of
man’s ineluctable desire to touch the divine—in fact underscore the profound
communion that still exists between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West,
a true unity of heart and mind that existed for a millennium before the Great
Schism and which can be fully realized once again.27 Given this common

24. Id.
25. See infra Part V.B.
26. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19.
27. But see Ralph C. Wood, Ivan Karamazov’s Mistake, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2002, at 29
(“Though he was a student of Western Christianity and culture, Dostoevsky remained
fundamentally Russian in his conception of God and the world, of good and evil, of the sacred
and the secular. We cannot properly understand his treatment of these matters, therefore, until we
grasp his Orthodox reading of them.”).
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heritage and John Paul’s fervent hope to bring about the reunion of East and
West, to see the Church once again “breathe with her two lungs,”28 perhaps it
is not surprising that Dostoevsky would share the Pope’s understanding of
what law can and cannot accomplish.
The Brothers Karamazov tells the story of three brothers, Ivan, Dmitry,
and Alyosha, and their lecherous drunkard father, Fyodor Karamazov.29
Before Fyodor’s murder at the hands of his bastard child Smerdyakov—the
central point of action in the novel—Alyosha suffers another kind of loss.30
His friend and spiritual mentor, Father Zosima, the elder of the monastery
where Alyosha serves as a novice, is ill and near death.31 Before passing away,
however, Father Zosima shares with Alyosha and his other visitors the story of
his life prior to becoming a monk.32
As a young man, Zosima was an officer in the military who became
infatuated with a young woman.33 She later married another young man while
the future monk was away on assignment.34 Zosima later learned that the
woman had in fact been engaged to the other man throughout the period of
their friendship.35 The young officer had only imagined their future romance
together.36 Eager to save his pride, Zosima provokes his would-be rival by
publicly insulting the man, and the two agree to a duel with pistols.37 In the
morning before the duel is to take place, however, Zosima experiences a
conversion in which he recognizes his own absurd vanity and sees plainly the
overwhelming mercy of God.38 He is overcome by the conviction that “every
one of us is answerable for everyone else.”39

28. Ut Unum Sint, supra note 11, para. 54; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER
Orientale Lumen (1995) (appreciating the special gifts of the Eastern churches and insisting on
the need to bring about full communion among all the particular churches in the one Church of
Christ), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_
jp-ii_apl_02051995_orientale-lumen_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER
Slavorum Apostoli (1985) (reflecting in part on the catholicity of the Church and of the common
ecclesial and cultural heritage of the Slavic churches, both Catholic and Orthodox), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_19850602_
slavorum-apostoli_en.html.
29. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 340.
32. Id. at 344–92.
33. Id. at 356.
34. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 356–57.
35. Id. at 357.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 358–59.
39. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19,at 359.
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Although hoping to avoid any bloodshed, Zosima dutifully attends the
duel.40 His opponent fires the first shot grazing him across the cheek.41
Zosima then tosses his own pistol aside and asks the man for forgiveness for
deliberately offending him and so compelling him to attempt to take the life of
another.42 Although berated by his fellow officers at first, they accept his
conduct as a courageous act when he tells them that he has resigned his
commission and has decided to enter the monastery.43 While his resignation is
pending, Zosima becomes the talk of the town.44 He enjoys a period of newfound celebrity and is a frequent guest at numerous parties and gatherings.45
On one such occasion he is introduced to Mikhail, a mysterious older
visitor with a special interest in Zosima’s story of forgiveness.46 The two
become friends and spend many late nights in conversation.47 We later learn
that, many years before, Mikhail killed a young woman who rejected his
marriage proposal.48 Suspicion fell on one of the murdered woman’s servants
who died in the midst of the trial. Thus, although everyone believed that
justice had been served, the crime was never solved.49 One evening, before
confessing his crime to Zosima, Mikhail and the future monk talk about the
state of the world and how it can be changed.50 In recalling the conversation,
Zosima relates the following:
He spoke with fervor and looked at me mysteriously, as if asking something of
me.
“As to every man being answerable for everybody and everything, not just for
his own sins,” he went on, “you are absolutely right about it, and the way you
succeeded in grasping that idea so fully, all at once, is really remarkable. It is
true that when men understand that idea, the kingdom of God will no longer be
a dream but a reality.”
“But when do you expect that to happen?” I cried bitterly. “When will it
come about, if ever? Perhaps it’s just a dream and nothing more.”
“So you don’t believe yourself,” he answered, “in the things you preach to
others. Let me tell you, then, that this dream, as you call it, will most certainly
come true. You may rest assured of that, but it will not happen immediately,

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 360–62.
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 362.
Id.
Id. at 364–65.
Id.
Id. at 367–68.
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 369.
Id. at 365–66.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

326

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:317

because everything that happens in the world is controlled by its own set of
laws. In this case, it is a psychological matter, a state of mind. In order to
change the world, man’s way of thinking must be changed. Thus, there can be
no brotherhood of men before all men become each other’s brothers. There is
no science, no order based on the pursuit of material gain, that will enable men
to share their goods fairly and to respect each other’s rights. There will never
be enough to satisfy everyone; men will always be envious of their neighbors
and will always destroy one another. So to your question when heaven on
earth will come about, I can only promise you that it will come without fail,
but first the period of man’s isolation must come to an end.”
“What isolation?” I asked him.
“The isolation that you find everywhere, particularly in our age. But it won’t
come to an end right now, because the time has not yet come. Today everyone
asserts his own personality and strives to live a full life as an individual. But
these efforts lead not to a full life but to suicide, because, instead of realizing
his personality, man only slips into total isolation. For in our age mankind has
been broken up into self-contained individuals, each of whom retreats into his
lair, trying to stay away from the rest, hiding himself and his belongings from
the rest of mankind, and finally isolating himself from people and people from
him. And, while he accumulates material wealth in his isolation, he thinks
with satisfaction how mighty and secure he has become, because he is mad and
cannot see that the more goods he accumulates, the deeper he sinks into
suicidal impotence. The reason for this is that he has become accustomed to
relying only on himself; he has split off from the whole and become an isolated
unit; he has trained his soul not to rely on human help, not to believe in men
and mankind, and only to worry that the wealth and privileges he has
accumulated may get lost. Everywhere men today are turning scornfully away
from the truth that the security of the individual cannot be achieved by his
isolated efforts but only by mankind as a whole.
“But an end to this fearful isolation is bound to come and all men will
understand how unnatural it was for them to have isolated themselves from one
another. This will be the spirit of the new era and people will look back in
amazement at the past, when they sat in darkness and refused to see the light.
And it is then that the sign of the Son of Man will appear in the heavens . . .
But until that day we must keep hope alive, and now and then a man must set
an example, if only an isolated one, by trying to lift his soul out of its isolation
and offering it up in an act of brotherly communion, even if he is taken for one
51
of God’s fools. This is necessary, to keep the great idea alive.”

51. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

A.

JOHN PAUL II, THE STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE LIMITS OF LAW

327

Materialism and Alienation: The Characteristics of Modern Social Life

Father Zosima’s interlocutor offers a diagnosis of the ills of modern
society that is strikingly similar to the Church’s social teaching in a number of
important respects. First, he identifies the central problem of modern society
as that of “isolation,”52 an attitude and plan of action in which “everyone
asserts his own personality and strives to live a full life as an individual.”53
This in turn leads to the atomization of society, “broken up into self-contained
individuals, each of whom retreats into his lair, trying to stay away from the
rest.”54 The isolated person “become[s] accustomed to relying only on
himself” and so places his or her hope for self-sufficiency and realization in the
accumulation of material wealth.55 Mikhail assures his friend that this desire to
separate one’s self from others is “unnatural,” “mad,” and a kind of “suicidal
impotence” since “the security of the individual cannot be achieved by his
isolated efforts but only by mankind as a whole.”56
Throughout her social magisterium, the Church has taught that the human
person can realize his or her authentic good and happiness only in and through
community. As the Second Vatican Council stated, social life is something
that is integral to the human person and “not something added on to man.”57
Indeed, although man often abuses his freedom by “indulg[ing] in too many of
life’s comforts and imprisons himself in a kind of splendid isolation,”58 the
Council insisted that “God did not create man for life in isolation, but for the
formation of social unity.”59 As Pope Paul VI neatly summarized, writing
shortly after the Council, “man finds his true identity only in his social
milieu.”60 In the contemporary world, however, the human person experiences
“a new loneliness . . . not in the face of a hostile nature which it has taken

52. Id. at 366. Plainly, this phenomenon has not escaped the notice even of those critics
writing from a secular point of view. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the phenomenon of the
disintegration of social structures in everyday life).
53. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 366.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH
IN THE MODERN WORLD Gaudium et Spes, para. 25 (1965) [hereinafter Gaudium et Spes],
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 166, 181, available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207
_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
58. Id. para. 31.
59. Id. para. 32.
60. POPE PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Populorum Progressio, para. 36 (1967)
[hereinafter Populorum Progressio], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at
240, 248, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_pvi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html.
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centuries to subdue, but in an anonymous crowd which surrounds him and in
which he feels himself a stranger.”61
The Church’s social tradition acknowledges the fact that, as a corporeal
being, the human person needs material possessions in order to survive.62
Beyond the desire to live in reasonable comfort, however, many people are
“infected with a practical materialism,”63 such that, especially in developed
countries, people “seem to be hypnotized, as it were, by economics, so that
almost their entire personal and social life is permeated with a certain
economic way of thinking.”64 When the salient feature of a given society
becomes an excessive concern with material possessions, then “men harden
their hearts, shut out others from their minds and gather together solely for
reasons of self-interest rather than out of friendship; dissension and disunity
follow soon after.”65 Indeed, in this context, the pursuit of material things
“prevents man’s growth as a human being and stands in opposition to his true

61. POPE PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER Octogesima Adveniens, para. 10 (1971) [hereinafter
Octogesima Adveniens], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 265, 268,
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/apost_letters/documents/hf_p-vi_apl_
19710514_octogesima-adveniens_en.html.
62. See POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Rerum Novarum, para. 34 (1891) [hereinafter
Rerum Novarum], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 14, 31, available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_
rerum-novarum_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Laborem Exercens, para. 1
(1981) [hereinafter Laborem Exercens], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16,
at 352–53 (through work man earns “the daily bread by which his body keeps alive”), available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981
_laborem-exercens_en.html; Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 14 (“Through his bodily
composition [man] gathers to himself the elements of the material world . . . [and] . . . through
him [they] raise their voice in free praise of the Creator.”).
63. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 10; see also Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para.
23 (declaring that a “practical materialism”—as opposed to a deeply theoretical materialism such
as can be found in Marxist thought—dominates thought regarding the human body, sexuality, and
procreation such that the criterion of personal dignity “is replaced by the criterion of efficiency,
functionality and usefulness: others are considered not for what they ‘are’, but for what they
‘have, do and produce’”). A “practical materialism” may be distinguished from a “theoretical
materialism” such as can be found in the thought of philosophers from Lucretius to Marx. A
person whose life reflects a practical materialism need not subscribe to some set of metaphysical
beliefs that confine the nature of reality to material existence. Instead, a person subscribes to a
practical materialism when the tacit premises that appear to inform his or her actions in life
suggest that there is nothing more at stake than the physical consequences of the here and now.
That is, even if such a person ostensibly believes in God and in the freedom and immortality of
the human soul, he or she nonetheless acts as if these things did not exist, as if they were not
intimately involved in the physical make-up of the universe, as if reality were confined to mere
physicality.
64. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 63.
65. Populorum Progressio, supra note 60, para. 19.
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grandeur,”66 a greatness which can only be attained by rejecting the isolation of
materialism and “enjoy[ing] the higher values of love and friendship, of prayer
and contemplation.”67
John Paul was an especially ardent critic of what he called the “error of
materialism” whereby man’s spiritual and personal dimensions are placed “in a
position of subordination to material reality.”68 Although deeply critical of the
theory and practice of socialism, John Paul saw in the consumerism of
developed countries a “crass materialism”69 involving “an excessive promotion
of purely utilitarian values, with an appeal to the appetites and inclinations
towards immediate gratification.”70 In these societies, the human person “is
seen more as a producer or consumer of goods than as a subject who produces
and consumes in order to live.”71 Indeed, in a society defined by material
acquisition and consumption, the human person “is directed towards ‘having’
rather than ‘being.’”72 He or she is encouraged to want “to have more, not in
order to be more but in order to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself.”73
Because the aspirations of the human person exceed the bounds of the merely
physical, the practice of materialism invariably leads to “radical
dissatisfaction”74 and a sense of alienation.75
Indeed, in his analysis of alienation in both socialist and liberal societies,
John Paul offers perhaps the most powerful critique of the modern
phenomenon that Dostoevsky identifies as “isolation.”76 According to the late
Pope, Marxism was right to criticize bourgeois capitalist society, but wrong in
that its criticism was “based on a mistaken and inadequate idea of alienation,
derived solely from the sphere of relationships of production and ownership.”77
As such, it understood and attempted to correct the phenomenon of alienation
entirely in materialist terms. Thus, Marxism sought to overcome the alienation
suffered by workers in being separated from the product of their labor through
the elimination of private property and the collective ownership of the means

66. Id.
67. Id. para. 20.
68. Laborem Exercens, supra note 62, para. 13.
69. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, para. 28 (1987)
[hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at
395, 412, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_
jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html.
70. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 29.
71. Id. para. 39.
72. Id. para. 36.
73. Id.
74. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69.
75. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41.
76. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 366.
77. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41.
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of production.78 John Paul noted, however, that the historical experience of
socialist countries “sadly demonstrated that collectivism does not do away with
alienation but rather increases it, adding to it a lack of basic necessities and
economic inefficiency.”79
In capitalist societies, John Paul observed a distinct but related form of
alienation. That is, unlike the economies under socialism, plagued by chronic
inefficiencies and shortages, capitalist economies have been marked by a
relatively high level of material prosperity.80 It is this very success, however—
combined with a culture that encourages consumption—that has lead to the
acute sense of emptiness and isolation endemic to the developed countries of
the West.81 What the alienation of socialism and capitalism share in common,
then, is the root error of materialism. As John Paul makes clear, however, the
effects of this error in capitalist societies have been especially pernicious. In
these societies people experience a “loss of the authentic meaning of life,”
namely, love.82 As the late Pope taught, echoing the teaching of the Council,
love is man’s origin, his purpose, and his final calling.83 Indeed, it is only
“through the free gift of self that man truly finds himself.”84
Thus, the human person “is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and
to live the experience of selfgiving and of the formation of an authentic human
community.”85 Likewise, “[a] society is alienated if its forms of social
organization, production and consumption make it more difficult to offer this
gift of self and to establish this solidarity between people.”86 Consequently,
those who inhabit a culture of consumerism often fall prey to a kind of selflove. They become “ensnared in a web of false and superficial gratifications”
and so are unable “to experience their personhood in an authentic and concrete

78. See, e.g., Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARXENGELS READER 66 (Richard C. Tucker ed., 2d ed., 1978).
79. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Perhaps John Paul II’s most eloquent statement on love and its essential connection to
human nature can be found in his first encyclical. Redemptor Hominis, supra note 7, para. 10.
The centrality of love in the vocation of men and women has been a theme taken up with renewed
vigor by John Paul’s successor. See POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Deus Caritas
Est (2005), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/
hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html.
84. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41 (explaining that through love “man finds
again the greatness, dignity and value that belongs to his humanity”); see also Gaudium et Spes,
supra note 57, para. 24 (“[M]an, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself,
cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.”).
85. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41.
86. Id.
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way.”87 Where this kind of alienation takes hold, society ceases to be a
community of persons and instead becomes “a mass of individuals placed side
by side, but without any mutual bonds.”88 In this setting, the isolation that
Mikhail describes holds sway as each individual “wishes to assert himself
independently of the other and in fact intends to make his own interests
prevail.”89
B.

Solidarity: The Human Person and Community

Second, Mikhail says that the antidote for the isolation that afflicts modern
society is for people to realize the idea that Zosima grasped in the moment of
his conversion, namely, that “every man [is] answerable for everybody and
everything, not just for his own sins.”90 In Catholic social thought, the idea
that men and women, across space and time, share a radical connection with
one another is known as the principle of solidarity.91 As John Paul II explained
in his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, solidarity is not “a feeling of vague
compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes” of others.92 Rather, “it is a
firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good.”93
Indeed, solidarity is the antithesis of the self-consuming isolation that Mikhail
criticizes. It reflects a “readiness . . . to ‘lose oneself’ for the sake of the other
instead of exploiting him, and to ‘serve him’ instead of oppressing him for
one’s own advantage.”94 Thus, solidarity is a conviction, and not a mere
sentiment because it involves the recognition of a truth that moves the will to
action—the truth that all of humanity is radically connected such that no
individual can truly be free, can truly be him or herself if another is
diminished.

87. Id.
88. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 20.
89. Id.
90. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 365.
91. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para 38.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. For a useful discussion of John Paul’s use of the term “solidarity” as an attitude,
virtue, principle, and obligation, see Patricia A. Lamoureux, Commentary on Laborem Exercens
(On Human Work), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 389, 398–99 (Kenneth R. Himes,
O.F.M. ed. 2005) [hereinafter MODERN CATHOLIC] and Charles E. Curren, Kenneth R. Himes,
O.F.M., & Thomas A. Shannon, Commentary on Sollicitudo rei socialis (On Social Concern), in
MODERN CATHOLIC, supra, at 415, 426–30.
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C. The Insufficiency of Mere Structural Change
Third, and relatedly, Mikhail maintains a healthy skepticism regarding the
efficacy of changes in social structure to bring forth what he refers to in
biblical language as “the Kingdom of God.”95 With respect to economic
justice, for example, he insists that “[t]here is no science, no order based on the
pursuit of material gain, that will enable men to share their goods fairly and
respect each other’s rights.”96 The reason why such efforts will always fall
short is that there will always be some scarcity and “men will always be
envious of their neighbors.”97 What is needed is something more than a new
program or method of operation. What is needed is a change in the hearts of
men and women. As Mikhail bluntly states, “In order to change the world,
man’s way of thinking must be changed.”98
As set forth in greater detail in the section that follows,99 the Catholic
social tradition has long held that the elimination of unjust structures and
patterns of behavior will never be sufficient to bring about a truly just society.
Law—including the structures that law creates and regulates—operates on the
human person largely, although not exclusively, as an external force, an
efficient cause. As a coercive force, law cannot effect change from the inside.
Standing alone, it cannot change the internal dispositions and attitudes of the
human person.
Echoing the teaching of his predecessors, John Paul II made clear in his
encyclical Centesimus Annus that the transformation of society involves two
enormous tasks.100 First, society has an obligation to remove the “specific
structures of sin which impede the full realization of those who are in any way
oppressed by them” and “replace them with more authentic forms of living in
community.”101 At the same time, he warns that structural transformation is
secondary to moral renovation. That is, “the first and most important task [to
be] accomplished [is] within man’s heart” in which everyone comes to
recognize and embrace an “active commitment to [one’s] neighbor” since “no
one can consider himself extraneous or indifferent to the lot of another member
of the human family.”102 Solidarity should impel the human person to break
out of the isolation that characterizes so much of modern life and work to
remove the structures that impede the cause of justice, as well as the
impediments that lie within his or her own heart.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 365.
Id.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 365.
See infra Part II.B.
Centesimus Annus, supra note 16.
Id. para. 38.
Id. para. 51.
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II. STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE NEED FOR PERSONAL CONVERSION
Beginning with Pope Leo XIII’s critique of unregulated market capitalism
in Rerum Novarum, the Church’s social doctrine has been deeply critical of
institutions and systems that victimize the weak and work to corrupt those with
power.103 The “structures of sin” that haunt the men and women of today take
many forms.104 Among the many sources of injustice that have taken
institutional form in the modern world, the Church’s social tradition has
specifically identified and critiqued the militarism and competition in arms
among nations;105 the systemic mistreatment of ethnic and racial minorities;106
the neo-colonialism that defined the immediate post-war era and the harmful
effects of global trade on local economies and ways of life;107 the perverse
incentives created by the legal form of the modern business corporation;108
and the modern state as such, which often arrogates to itself responsibility over
matters that properly rest with individuals, families, and intermediate
institutions of free association.109

103. See Rerum Novarum, supra note 62.
104. See Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para 36.
105. POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Pacem in Terris, paras. 109–19 (1963)
[hereinafter Pacem in Terris], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 131,
148–50, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jxxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html; SYNOD OF BISHOPS, JUSTICE IN THE WORLD (1971),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 288–89 (“The arms race is a threat to
man’s highest good, which is life; it makes poor peoples and individuals yet more miserable,
while making richer those already powerful; it creates a continuous danger of conflagration, and
in the case of nuclear arms, it threatens to destroy all life from the face of the earth.”); Populorum
Progressio, supra note 60, para. 53 (calling the arms race “debilitating”); Centesimus Annus,
supra note 16, para. 18 (bemoaning the fact that “[a]n insane arms race [has] swallowed up the
resources needed for the development of national economies and for assistance to the less
developed nations”).
106. Pacem in Terris, supra note 105, paras. 94–100; Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para.
29 (“[W]ith respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether
social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion, is to
be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God’s intent.”); Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 61,
para. 16 (condemning discrimination and calling for the “fair sharing” of a nation’s riches).
107. Populorum Progressio, supra note 60, para. 52 (describing “a new form of colonialism”
as one that “exert[s] economic pressure . . . or create[s] a new power group with controlling
influence”).
108. POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Quadragesimo Anno, para. 132 (1931) [hereinafter
Quadragesimo Anno], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 42, 72 (stating
that laws “dividing and limiting the risk of business” define the corporate form and have “given
occasion to the most sordid license” and “reduced [the] obligation of accountability” such that
“directors of business companies, forgetful of their trust, betray the rights of those whose savings
they have undertaken to administer”), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html.
109. Id. paras. 78–79.
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The Phenomenon of Social Sin

Although many examples of “social sin” appear throughout the Catholic
social tradition, the idea itself did not receive a thorough exposition and
conceptual development until the pontificate of John Paul II. Specifically, the
concept of “social sin” and “structures of sin” was the subject of some
sustained reflection both in John Paul’s 1984 post-synodal apostolic
exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia110 and his 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo
Rei Socialis.111
What stands out in John Paul’s analysis is a recognition that unjust
structures exist in the world which ties these structures to the personal sins of
individuals. Thus, according to the Pope, “it is not out of place to speak of
‘structures of sin’” so long as it is understood that such institutions and
methods of behavior are always “rooted in personal sin, and thus always linked
to the concrete acts of individuals.”112 Indeed, “[s]in, in the proper sense, is
always a personal act . . . an act of freedom on the part of an individual person
and not properly of a group or community.”113 Thus, the Church rejects the
notion that injustice is present in the world simply because of the existence of
“some vague entity or anonymous collectivity such as the situation, the system,
society, structures or institutions.”114 As John Paul makes clear, it is
individuals “who introduce these structures, consolidate them and make them
difficult to remove.”115 Because the exercise of human freedom is always
“conditioned by the social structure in which [a person] lives, by the education
he has received and by his environment,”116 when these malignant social forms
go unchallenged, they “grow stronger, spread, and become the source of other
sins, and so influence people’s behavior.”117
Thus, the Pope sees the relationship between structures of sin and
particular sinful acts as dynamic and mutually reinforcing. On the one hand,
unjust institutions and social phenomena are themselves the “result of the

110. POPE JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION Reconciliatio et
Paenitentia (1984) [hereinafter Reconciliatio et Paenitentia], available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_02121984_reconciliatio-etpaenitentia_en.html.
111. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69. Although the vocabulary employed may have
been different, the concept of social sin long preceded the advent of modern Catholic social
teaching. See Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of Social Sin in Its Thomistic Roots, 7 J. MARKETS
& MORALITY 363 (2004).
112. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para. 36.
113. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16.
114. Id.
115. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para. 36.
116. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 38.
117. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 34, para. 36.
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accumulation and concentration of many personal sins.”118 Indeed, these
structures continue to exist precisely because individuals deliberately choose to
seek their own advantage at the expense of others, or by acting with complicity
or indifference in the face of evil.119 On the other hand, these structures
encourage unjust behavior by creating the aura of normalcy and legitimacy.
As a consequence, “the moral conscience of many people becomes seriously
clouded,” the difference between right and wrong is obscured, and people
experience a “loss of the sense of sin.”120 Thus, a given social structure—such
as a system of short-term economic incentives that discourage employers from
paying workers a living wage, or a culture of racial discrimination deeply
rooted in the practices and customs of a given community—is not in itself a
primary cause of moral evil since “an institution, a structure, society itself . . .
is not in itself the subject of moral acts.”121 Instead, the subject of all moral
action is the human person who remains free to choose how to live his life
within the limits of the circumstances that surround him. Accordingly, “[a]t
the heart of every situation of sin are always to be found sinful people.”122
B.

Papal and Conciliar Teaching on the Limitations of Structural Reform

Although the Church has long advocated the elimination of unjust
structures, customs, and modes of behavior, Catholic social teaching has never
held that structural reform by itself will ever be sufficient to bring about the
creation of a just society. Indeed, humanity’s fallen nature and the proclivity
of men and women to pursue their own advantage at the expense of others
suggests—and human experience confirms—that once the current unjust
structures are swept away they will be replaced by new and perhaps more
virulent social forms of oppression and exploitation.123 Thus, in advocating for

118. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16.
119. Id.
120. Id. para. 18.
121. Id. para. 16.
122. Id.
123. It is precisely for this reason that, contrary to the suggestions of some critics, compare
Leonid Kishkovsky, An Ecumenical Afterword to A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT:
ESSAYS ON “RERUM NOVARUM” AND NINE OTHER KEY DOCUMENTS 177, 179–81 (George
Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1991) [hereinafter A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT]
(citing Father Alexander Schmemann and arguing that the Church in the West incorrectly saw
itself as “an institution that assists in the achievement in this world of human dreams and
aspirations” thus lending support to “secular eschatologies” and “secular utopias” and claiming
that the Church in the East can help recover “the eschatological perspective of Christianity” that
eschews all ideology), Catholic social thought is not tinged with utopianism. Indeed, it views the
world through the clear lens of Christian realism, a lens which plainly sees human nature as fallen
but redeemed through the power of Christ and his cross. As an “expert in humanity,” the Church
knows that every utopian vision of earthly paradise is doomed to failure. Pope Paul VI, Address
Before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 4, 1965) (internal quotation omitted).
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change in the social order, the Church has always championed another, deeper
kind of reform—a reform of the human heart.
This dual concern for structural change and personal reform has been a
consistent theme in Catholic social thought from its inception. For example, in
Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII argued on behalf of the right of laborers to
work under humane conditions and to receive a just wage, and against the
exploitation of workers under unconscionable wage contracts.124 At the same
time, Leo makes clear that “the chief good that society can possess is
virtue.”125 Although Leo clearly sees a role for the state in relieving misery
and achieving just relations among men, he insists that “no human expedients
will ever make up for the devotedness and self sacrifice of Christian
charity.”126 Here, as William Murphy has noted, Leo not only makes clear the
bond “between the commitment to social justice and the necessity of the
virtuous life,” he also upholds “the life of charity as the ultimate flowering of
the search for justice.”127
In his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI made even more
explicit the need for a genuine moral renovation to accompany the reform of
social institutions and practices. Indeed, Pius insisted that all efforts aimed at
the “reconstruction and perfection of social order can surely in no wise be
brought to realization without reform of morality.”128 Specifically, Pius
contended that a truly meaningful “social reconstruction . . . must be [preceded
by] a renewal of the Christian spirit” and that, in the absence of such renewal,
“all our efforts will be futile and our social edifice will be built not upon a
rock, but upon shifting sand.”129
John XXIII devoted his encyclical Pacem in Terris to the subject of peace
among nations.130 This reflection took place in the shadow of an escalating
arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as an oftenbloody competition for allies among developing nations.131 Indeed, John
issued the encyclical only a few months after the Cuban Missile Crisis when
the superpowers and the world came perilously close to the calamity of nuclear

Moreover, Catholic social thought is not an ideology and the Church has no concrete model of
action to put forth. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 43. At the same time, the Church
looks to the future with confident hope knowing that within the hearts of men and women lies the
seed of genuine cultural renewal and societal transformation.
124. Rerum Novarum, supra note 62, paras. 34–35.
125. Id. para. 34.
126. Id. para. 30.
127. William Murphy, Rerum Novarum, in A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT,
supra note 123, at 1, 24.
128. Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 108, para. 97.
129. Id. para. 127.
130. Pacem in Terris, supra note 105.
131. Id. para. 109–13.
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conflagration. John’s letter contains many recommendations for structural
reform among nations and within the international order. These include the
universal recognition and enforcement of human rights, support for democratic
forms of government, calls for disarmament, and the establishment of an
effective world authority.132 Even if these sorts of reforms are implemented,
however, John insists that structural changes will only go so far: “The world
will never be the dwelling place of peace, till peace has found a home in the
heart of each and every man, till every man preserves in himself the order
ordained by God to be preserved.”133
Building on the work of Pope John and his predecessors, the Second
Vatican Council offered a similar diagnosis, and insisted on the need for both
structural change and moral renewal. In Gaudium et Spes the Council fathers
noted that “the disturbances which so frequently occur in the social order result
in part from the natural tensions of economic, political and social forms” but
that “at a deeper level they flow from man’s pride and selfishness, which
contaminate even the social sphere.”134 Thus, according to the Council, the
problems that beset the modern world are not the result of the mere existence
of certain unjust “social forms.”135 Because justice is a virtue that describes
the dynamic of relations among people, it cannot be achieved through the
simple, mechanical removal of an unjust “part.”136 Admittedly, the depravity
of some customs, methods of operation, and structures may be so profound that
their existence precludes the possibility of a truly just social order, and the
presence of these institutional forms in social life may well create “new
inducements to sin.”137 Nevertheless, structures, standing alone, are impotent.
The ultimate source of the injustice that afflicts the world is the wrongful
exercise of human freedom by individuals. Thus, the creation of a truly just
social order will require more than simply the reform or removal of the
structures of sin. Instead, as the Council noted, it will require the reform of
every human heart through “strenuous efforts and the assistance of grace.”138
Following the Council, Paul VI expressed a similar skepticism regarding
the likely success of structural changes, standing alone. Paul’s teaching is
distinguished, however, in that it is set forth in deeply personal, indeed,
existential terms. Paul insists that the cause of social renewal cannot be
confined to the reform of institutions: “It is not enough,” he says, “to recall
principles, state intentions, point to crying injustice and utter prophetic

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. paras. 11–27, 67–79, 109–19, 130–45.
Id. para. 165.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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denunciations.”139 Indeed, “[i]t is too easy to throw back on others
responsibility for injustice, if at the same time one does not realize how each
one shares in it personally, and how personal conversion is needed first.”140
Thus, every person must “examine himself, to see what he has done up to now,
and what he ought to do.”141
Even more than his predecessors, John Paul stressed the limitations of
merely bureaucratic and institutional reforms in effecting authentic social
change. As someone who lived through and indeed resisted both the Nazi
occupation of Poland and the ensuing Communist dictatorship, John Paul was
someone well acquainted with the most elaborate and malevolent structures of
sin imaginable. Accordingly, a call for thorough-going institutional reform in
various aspects of social life was a common theme throughout John Paul’s
social magisterium. At the same time, John Paul knew, far better than his
adversaries, that in many areas of life, law is unable to effect change precisely
because the coercive power of the state cannot reach into the recesses of the
human heart. Despite its seeming omnipotence, law cannot make human
beings act with genuine charity toward one another, nor can it make someone
believe that which his or her conscience and reason refuse to accept as true.142
Moreover, when it attempts to change that which it cannot, law becomes a
cruel caricature of itself by destroying the very subject it was designed to
serve, namely, the human person. As one cognizant of law’s limits, John Paul
was also mindful of the fact that “even when such a situation can be changed in
its structural and institutional aspects by the force of law . . . the change [often]
proves to be incomplete, of short duration and ultimately vain and
ineffective—not to say counterproductive if the people directly or indirectly
responsible for that situation are not converted.”143
III. LAW AND THE PRIORITY OF CULTURE
John Paul’s appreciation for the limits of law is evidenced not only in his
treatment of the “structures of sin,” but also in his analysis of “culture,” an
analysis which appears as a recurring theme throughout his pontificate. The
fathers of the Second Vatican Council made “culture” a center point of the
Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium
139. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 61, para. 48.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Cf. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Dignitatis Humanae Personae, para. 1 (1965) [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae], reprinted in THE
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, at 675 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., & Joseph Gallagher trans., 1966)
(“The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the
mind at once quietly and with power.”), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
143. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16.
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et Spes.144 Unfortunately, their use of the word was marked by a certain
“terminological looseness.”145 Indeed, despite the frequent reference made to
“culture” throughout the document, the Council fathers “nonetheless failed to
identify precisely what they meant with each usage of the term.”146 Here John
Paul’s thoughtful treatment of “culture” supplies a useful tonic for the careless
overuse of this word.
A.

John Paul II and the Meaning of “Culture”

According to John Paul, culture can be found at the center of society and
the experience of every person because of the answers it provides to life’s most
basic questions. That is, the human person is a being who cannot avoid
confronting certain questions regarding the nature of his or her existence:
“Who am I? Where have I come from and where am I going? Why is there
evil? What is there after this life?”147 Indeed, for John Paul, “[n]o one can
escape from the fundamental questions: What must I do? How do I distinguish
Precisely because “[n]o-one can avoid this
good from evil?”148
144. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, paras. 53–62.
145. See TRACEY ROWLAND, CULTURE AND THE THOMIST TRADITION AFTER VATICAN II 18
(2003).
146. Id. at 20.
147. Fides et Ratio, supra note 13, para. 1 (emphasis omitted).
148. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, para. 2 (emphasis omitted). In presenting these
questions as central to the “mystery of man,” John Paul was again echoing the teaching of the
Second Vatican Council. Accord Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 10 (noting “the number
constantly swells of the people who raise the most basic questions or recognize them with a new
sharpness: What is man? What is this sense of sorrow, of evil, of death, which continues to exist
despite so much progress? What purpose have these victories purchased at so high a cost? What
can man offer to society, what can he expect from it? What follows this earthly life?”); SECOND
VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHURCH TO
NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS Nostra Aetate, para. 1 (1965), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN II, at 660 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., & Joseph Gallagher trans., 1966) (referring to
“the unsolved riddles of the human condition, which today, even as in former times, deeply stir
the hearts of men: What is man? What is the meaning [and] aim of our life? What is moral good
[and] what [is] sin? Whence suffering and what purpose does it serve? Which is the road to true
happiness? What are death, judgment and retribution after death? What, finally, is that ultimate
inexpressible mystery which encompasses our existence: whence do we come, and where are we
going?”), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/
vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html.
For both the Pope and the Council, and indeed the Church throughout history, “the
decisive answer to every one of man’s questions, his religious and moral questions in particular,
is given by Jesus Christ, or rather is Jesus Christ himself, as the Second Vatican Council recalls:
‘In fact, it is only in the mystery of the Word incarnate that light is shed on the mystery of man.’”
Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, para. 2 (quoting Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 22).
Thus, “[t]he man who wishes to understand himself thoroughly—and not just in accordance with
immediate, partial, often superficial, and even illusory standards and measures of his being—he
must with his unrest, uncertainty and even his weakness and sinfulness, with his life and death,
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questioning,”149 “all men and women . . . are in some sense philosophers” in
that, “one way or [an]other, they shape a comprehensive vision and an answer
to the question of life’s meaning; and in the light of this they interpret their
own life’s course and regulate their behaviour.”150 At the same time, the
human person is a social animal. He or she does not formulate the answers to
these questions in isolation. Instead, “[f]rom birth . . . [men and women] are
immersed in traditions which give them not only a language and a cultural
formation but also a range of truths in which they believe almost
instinctively.”151
A culture, then, constitutes the response that a given people have to these
fundamental questions, a response that is constantly being revised and worked
out over time. It is expressed not only through the customs and traditions of a
people, but through their language, history, art, commerce, and politics.
Indeed, “[a]ll human activity takes place within a culture and interacts with
culture.”152 At the same time, a given culture reveals its deepest identity in the
position it takes “towards the fundamental events of life, such as birth, love,
work and death” as well as “the mystery of God.”153 Thus, “[d]ifferent
cultures are basically different ways of facing the question of the meaning of
personal existence.”154
As such, every culture is, in essence, a normative and didactic enterprise.
It indicates what is desirable and permissible within a given society. It
instructs both the observer and the participant as to how they ought to act.
Indeed, as Joseph Pieper reminds us, and as the etymology of the word
confirms, at the heart of every “culture” is a “cult” in the sense of religious
devotion.155 That is, a culture is a societal answer to the question of value.
Every culture renders a whole series of judgments as to what is truly important
in life. In the norms implicit in the practices it supports and encourages, every
culture identifies what is really worth valuing, what is worth the sacrifice and
effort necessary to pursue and possess that which is most prized. Thus, in
draw near to Christ.” Redemptor Hominis, supra note 7, para. 10. Although it is entirely
appropriate to give cultural expression to this fundamentally Christocentric perspective, the
Church believes that to give legal expression to this truth in the form of coercive laws would
violate the dignity of the human person. See Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 142. Thus,
although Christ is the answer to all the questions of the human heart, he is the answer that people
must come to freely on their own. The state cannot force anyone to come to this truth, to embrace
Christ, without at the same time engaging in conduct that is deeply sinful and offensive to God.
149. Fides et Ratio, supra note 13, para. 27.
150. Id. para. 30.
151. Id. para. 31.
152. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 51.
153. Id. para. 24.
154. Id.
155. JOSEPH PIEPER, LEISURE THE BASIS OF CULTURE 76–77 (Alexander Dru trans.,
Pantheon Books 1952).
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ways which are sometimes subtle and sometimes overt, but which are always
readily understood, a given culture defines that which is truly deserving of
worship as the highest good to be attained.
B.

Identifying the Salient Features of American Culture

Again, the answers that a culture proposes to the fundamental questions
and events of life are not made in the abstract. Instead, they are made present
in the most mundane and concrete decisions of life. As John Paul makes clear,
“[a] given culture reveals its overall understanding of life through the choices
it makes in production and consumption.”156 Thus, looking at the United
States, the answers proposed by our culture to these basic questions can be
found in such things as the size and location of the homes that people choose to
build,157 in the number of hours they devote to work and to leisure,158 in the
kinds of cars they choose to drive, 159 in how they regard the durability and
disposability of both goods and packaging,160 in the kinds of meals they choose
to enjoy,161 and in their use of resources as basic as water.162 Plainly, the
156. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36.
157. ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE
OF THE AMERICAN DREAM x, 4 (2000) (lamenting the “self–destructive [growth]” of suburban
sprawl, which the authors consider a “soulless [collection of] subdivisions, . . . strip shopping
centers, . . . [and] office parks”); Fred A. Bernstein, Are McMansions Going Out of Style?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, §11, at 1 (reporting that the size of the average American house rose from
about 1,500 square feet in 1970 to over 2,300 square feet in 2001, but that the trend for larger
houses is abating).
158. Alberto Alesina et al., Work and Leisure in the United States and Europe: Why So
Different?, 20 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 1, 1 (2006) (arguing that Europeans work
more than Americans and take more vacations largely as a result of European labor market
regulations of the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s).
159. See KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: SUVS—THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS
VEHICLES AND HOW THEY GOT THAT WAY (2002) (highlighting the safety and environmental
concerns of sport utility vehicles and proposing various regulatory and other incentives to
increase safety standards or drive SUVs off the market).
160. See HEATHER ROGERS, GONE TOMORROW: THE HIDDEN LIFE OF GARBAGE 2 (2005)
(arguing that Americans produce the most waste of any country in the world and pointing out the
problems with wasteful packing, recycling programs, and flawed landfills and incinerators). But
see Kirk Johnson, Throwaway Societies of Yesteryear: Past Decades Were the Golden Ages for
Waste, Scientist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at B1 (reporting one study finding that New
York City’s output of garbage per person is decreasing over the course of the century).
161. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL
9 (2001) (discussing the “diverse influences of fast food . . . on [the] distinctively American way
of viewing the world” and arguing that consumers can positively affect social and economic
trends such as obesity, unsafe working conditions, and the domestic agriculture industry by
choosing not to purchase fast food).
162. EPA, CLEANER WATER THROUGH CONSERVATION (1995), available at
http://www.epa.gov (suggesting different methods of using water efficiently, thereby lowering the
high demand for water in the United States that can contribute to water source pollution).
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identity of a given culture is not confined to the ideas proposed by its writers
and artists. At the same time, the answers that our culture provides to life’s
questions can also be gleaned from the music,163 television, films,164 and other
forms of entertainment165 that Americans produce and consume.
These choices give some indication of what Americans consider important,
what it is that they believe is truly deserving of sacrifice, even worship.
Plainly, any attempt to summarize something as complicated as American
culture risks falling into caricature. General descriptions of vast subjects must,
of necessity, forgo nuance. Having said that, it would not be wrong to say that
the culture reflected in the choices made by most Americans is defined by a set
of “consumer attitudes and life-styles” that celebrate “having” over “being.”166
Indeed, the description that Father Zosima’s friend offers of a society in which
“the more goods [one] accumulates, the deeper [one] sinks into suicidal
impotence” is chilling in its familiarity.167 That is, although Americans have
often demonstrated a remarkable sense of generosity, especially in times of
crisis,168 the choices we make day to day, under ordinary circumstances, tend
to reflect a kind of “self-love which leads to an unbridled affirmation of selfinterest,” a self-love that often frustrates the demands of justice and the
requirements of the common good.169 Thus, the “cult” at the heart of

163. Steven C. Martino et al., Exposure to Degrading Versus Nondegrading Music Lyrics and
Sexual Behavior Among Youth, 118 PEDIATRICS 430 (2006) (arguing that the degrading sexual
lyrics prevalent in popular music contribute to the problem of early and risky sexual activity in
the United States).
164. See KID STUFF: MARKETING SEX AND VIOLENCE TO AMERICA’S CHILDREN (Diane
Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2003) (concluding that exposure to entertainment containing
explicit sex and violence negatively affects the social and psychological development of
adolescents, and urging parents to counter negative media messages by discussing them with
children).
165. See THOMAS BARKER & MARJIE BRITZ, JOKERS WILD: LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000) (conducting an examination of legalized gambling in the United
States and its effects on individuals and communities); PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE:
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET (2001) (urging more effective law enforcement against
child pornography and suggesting a prohibition of the newsgroups and message boards where the
child pornography subculture communicates); PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS, INC.: 100 YEARS OF
SPORTS BUSINESS (2004) (describing the growth of the sports entertainment industry and
analyzing modern income sources and sports marketing techniques).
166. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36 (emphasis omitted).
167. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 366.
168. See Anna M. Tinsley, Outpouring of Donations After Katrina Largest Ever, PITT. POSTGAZETTE, Aug. 27, 2006, at A11 (stating the Americans gave $4.2 billion for Katrina relief,
exceeding the previous record of $3 billion given after the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
169. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 17.
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American “culture” may be described as a cult of the individual, a cult of the
autonomous self.170
C. The Relationship Between Law and Culture
John Paul recognizes that people must enjoy a large measure of freedom in
the exercise of culture.171 Because culture is a vast, decentralized phenomenon
that is expressed only over time through the accretion of numerous individual
decisions involving a multiplicity of activities, in a society that values
freedom,172 law is ill-suited to bring about a thorough-going cultural
transformation. Instead, according to John Paul, what is urgently needed is the
cultural work of education “including the education of consumers in the
responsible use of their power of choice [and] the formation of a strong sense
of responsibility among producers.”173 By “education,” the Pope does not
mean a formal system of indoctrination or the imposition of an ideology.174
The education that must take place is a matter of persuasion, not coercion.175
That is, it must be freely accepted by those to whom it is proposed.
As such, the change in society that the Pope has in mind will not come
about principally through a change in the law. To repeat, John Paul
acknowledges the need to alter “the established structures of power which

170. John Paul believes that this worship of the self is the consequence of the separation of
freedom from truth. See, e.g., Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, paras. 32, 35 (describing certain
currents in modern thought in which “[t]he individual conscience is accorded the status of a
supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about
good and evil” and that the freedom to “create values” goes beyond a claim to “moral autonomy”
and “actually amount[s] to an absolute sovereignty”); Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 19
(stating that the contemporary understanding of freedom “exalts the isolated individual in an
absolute way” and “ends up by becoming the freedom of ‘the strong’ against the weak who have
no choice but to submit”). Thus, at the heart of his critique of this radical liberalism is a flawed
anthropology, that is, a loss of “the truth about man.” Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, para. 31.
171. Cf. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 59 (stating that “culture . . . has constant need
of a just liberty in order to develop” and that “[i]t is not [public authority’s] function to determine
the character of the civilization”).
172. It is not by coincidence that the tumultuous period in Chinese history in the 1960s and
1970s under Mao Zedong is known as the “Cultural Revolution,” nor is it a coincidence that the
Chinese Communist authorities in power did not value individual freedom and so were quite
content to effect the cultural changes they sought through the force of law. See generally THE
CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY (Joseph W. Esherick et al. eds., 2006).
173. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36.
174. Cf. id. para. 46 (insisting that Christian truth is not an ideology in that it “does not . . .
imprison changing socio-political realities in a rigid schema”).
175. Cf. Pope John Paul II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Redemptoris Missio, para. 39 (1990) (“The
Church proposes; she imposes nothing. She respects individuals and cultures, and she honors the
sanctuary of conscience.”) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio_en.html.
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today govern societies.”176 Where justice is at stake, law has an indispensable
role to play in the regulation of social life.177 But law is itself a cultural
artifact. Law does not stand outside of culture but emerges from within it. At
the same time, law influences the very culture that produced it, causing that
culture to develop in ways that otherwise would not have taken place. Thus,
the relationship between law and culture is complex insofar as culture is both
generative of and responsive to law. As Francis George has noted, “[l]aw
contributes massively to the formation of culture [and] culture influences and
shapes law” such that the two “stand in a mutually informing, formative, and
reinforcing relationship.”178
At the same time, however, culture and law are not equal players in the
formation of social norms.
Instead, as George Weigel has written,
summarizing an important theme from John Paul’s pontificate, culture enjoys a
kind of priority “over politics and economics as the engine of historical
change.”179 First, culture enjoys a kind of logical priority over law.180 That is,
although every legal system is the intellectual product of some culture, not
every culture generates a system of laws.181 Admittedly, when a society attains
a certain size and level of complexity, informal social norms are often
superseded by laws that have been formally adopted. Moreover, many of the
values and beliefs that make up the culture typically receive some juridical
expression. This need not, however, be the case. No society can ever exist in
the absence of values, that is, without culture, but a society can exist
independent of any formal system of law.
Second, and relatedly, law is not, as a logical matter, necessary in order to
achieve the social goal for which it is established, namely, justice. Strictly
speaking, the laws of a given society are not the primary cause of it being

176. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 58.
177. See, e.g., id. para. 36 (referring to “the necessary intervention by public authorities”).
178. Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 9 (2003).
179. George Weigel, John Paul II and the Priority of Culture, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1998, at
19.
180. See S.L. Hurley, Objectivity and Disagreement, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A
TRIBUTE TO J.L. MACKIE 55 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985).
In general, to say that one concept or set of concepts is logically prior to another is to say
that the latter is properly accounted for and understood in terms of the former and not vice
versa; someone could grasp the prior concept without grasping the concept understood in
terms of it, but not vice versa. To deny a claim of logical priority is to deny that someone
could correctly understand one without understanding the other.
Id.
181. Here, I disagree with Cardinal George’s claim that, in the “complex dialectical
relationship” between law and culture, “[n]either comes first; neither comes last.” See George,
supra note 178, at 9. George’s claim is correct insofar as it is limited to the practical, temporal
order. For the reasons set forth above, however, on the conceptual level, culture enjoys a kind of
logical priority over law.
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either just or unjust.182 Instead, what makes a society just in the first instance
is that it is composed of just people—of men and women who desire justice
and who are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure that justice
Indeed, aside from the need for
characterizes their life together.183
coordination,184 a society made up of perfectly just individuals would have no

182. This claim is in need of some clarification. It is true that, as a primary matter, the laws
of a given society do not make the society either just or unjust. Nevertheless, it is also true that a
society composed of perfectly just individuals would still suffer from injustice if any one of its
laws repudiated the principles of justice. Indeed, this would be true even if the unjust law in
question did not affect the conduct of those whom it governed. For example, a state composed of
perfectly just individuals that chose to repeal its rape statute while maintaining other criminal
prohibitions against acts such as murder, assault and burglary, would be guilty of injustice even if
no one was victimized by rape following the statute’s repeal. This selective omission would, in a
soft but unmistakably clear voice, tell people what is and is not acceptable conduct. Likewise, a
state that enacted a statute that permitted whites to enslave non-whites would be unjust even if no
one attempted to practice slavery. That is, even if the law was in effect dead-letter—the sole
rhetorical remnant of a racist past long forgotten—it would still impair the full realization of
justice in the society by continuing to teach the superiority of some individuals over others.
Indeed, for the state to continue to exercise its teaching capacity in this manner—the official state
endorsement of injustice—would harm the common good, even if the message was ignored by
everyone. In the same way, a lie is harmful for being told, even if no one believes it. By contrast,
the state could teach a quite different lesson through repeal, a lesson not soon forgotten by the
state’s constituents. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional
state laws making interracial marriage illegal); Jeff Amy, Voters Strike Ban on Interracial
Marriage, MOBILE REGISTER, Nov. 8, 2000, at 24A (describing the results of the state
constitutional referendum that voided a portion of the Alabama constitution that had been
ineffective since the Loving decision).
183. The mere fact that a society has adopted laws that are just does not mean that its
members will exude justice. After all, individuals and groups may violate the law with impunity,
perhaps undetected, or the law may go unenforced by the state. Moreover, because justice is a
virtue of the individual, part of his or her constitution, it can only be acquired through the active
assimilation of the person. Thus, in this sense, a person cannot be “made” just simply by being
subject to just laws because a person is not “made” in the same way that a chair is “made” out of
a block of wood. Nevertheless, a person who is subject to just laws may acquire the virtue of
justice through the routine of right conduct. See 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
Pt. I–II, Q. 92, Art. 2, at 1002 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros.
1946) (1920) (“From being accustomed to avoid evil and fulfil what is good, through fear of
punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one’s own accord.
Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.”). Indeed, a person can
become just by doing what is just, repeatedly, within a given situation, such that the decision to
do what is right becomes a matter of habit. See also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105b
9–12 (W.D. Ross trans.), reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 956 (Richard McKeon
ed., 1963). The great Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins beautifully captured precisely this point
in one of his most famous verses: “I say more: the just man justices;/Keeps grace: that keeps all
his goings graces.” Gerard Manley Hopkins, As kingfishers catch fire, in GERARD MANLEY
HOPKINS: THE MAJOR WORKS 129 (Catherine Phillips ed., 2002).
184. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231–33 (1980) (arguing that,
absent unanimity, there is a need for some political authority to coordinate matters with respect to
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need of law since no one would violate the rights of any other person.185
Everyone in such a society would do what is right as a matter of habit and
desire and not out of compunction brought on by fear of the state.186 As Grant
Gilmore observed, echoing both St. Paul and the Federalist Papers, “The
better the society, the less law there will be. In Heaven there will be no
law . . . . The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will
be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.”187 From
this perspective the existence of law represents a kind of failure. Laws are a
second-best corrective that hope to make up for the absence of rightful conduct
in the first instance. As such, however, law is necessary in every society
composed of fallible human beings who, perhaps despite their better instincts,
often fail to render to one another that which is their due. In these imperfect
societies—in every society known throughout history—the law exists in order
to teach, to encourage, and to restore the order—the just order—that defines
the just society. Thus, as a practical matter, law and culture are virtually
inseparable.
Third, and perhaps most important of all, culture is, as an empirical matter,
vastly more important than law in shaping the everyday lives of people.
Indeed, this influence includes the immediate, practical decision as to whether
or not to obey the law. This decision is often based on the perceived justice of
the law as well as the perception that it will be fairly applied to different

the management of natural resources, the use of force, and the resolution of competing rights and
claims regarding the common good); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 107–
08 (1999) (admitting that in a society of “perfectly morally upright beings” laws against murder
and the like would not be necessary, but insisting that since “the moral point of law is to serve the
good of people as they are” such laws are necessary and proper and that they require the exercise
of authority to translate “natural principles of justice and political morality into rules and
principles of positive law”).
185. This captures something of what St. Paul means when he declares that Christians are not
subject to the specific provisions of the Mosaic law. Romans 6:14 (“For sin shall not have
dominion over you, for you are not under the law, but under grace.”); Galatians 5:18 (“But if you
are led by the Spirit, then you are not under the law.”). Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary.”).
186. Even if the law of a given society was perfectly just and its institutions well-ordered, the
life of the society might nevertheless be marked by grave injustice. Just laws and just social
structures do not and cannot ensure a just society since, as a fundamental matter, justice is a virtue
of character that one exemplifies in his or her relationships with others. See generally Robert
John Araujo, S.J., Realizing a Mission: Teaching Justice as “Right Relationship,” 74 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 591 (2000). Accordingly, what matters most in assessing the presence or absence of
justice within a given society is the content of the actions taken by its members in regard to one
another.
187. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
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individuals.188 Many of the social phenomena criticized by John Paul have a
legal dimension. Various legal doctrines and institutions support their
existence.189 Nevertheless, the legal nature of these phenomena is not primary.
Rather, they come into existence and are sustained in the legal and political
order because of some set of antecedent values that subsists in the culture.
Ultimately, the priority of culture over law means that “[t]he real
responsibility” for unjust structures as well as particular sinful acts “lies with
individuals.”190 Thus, John Paul insists that “the first and most important task
is accomplished within man’s heart.”191 Only by reaching the human heart will
the human person come to see him or herself less “as a producer or consumer
of goods” and more “as a subject who produces and consumes in order to
live.”192 Only then will individuals no longer regard “the production and
consumption of goods . . . [as] the centre of social life and society’s only
value.”193 Only then can new “life-styles”194 come about “in which the quest
for truth, beauty, goodness and communion with others for the sake of the
common growth are the factors which determine consumer choices, savings
and investments.”195 Only then will men and women feel free to turn away
from the cult of the autonomous self and embrace that which is truly deserving
of worship.
In sum, we can say that John Paul’s concern for the elimination of unjust
social structures is always tempered by the recognition that such actions will
not, as an ultimate matter in the temporal order,196 bring about a world of true
peace. Although he supports the use of law to dismantle the structures of sin,
John Paul believes that such actions will always be insufficient. New

188. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
189. For example, the market and its attendant consumerism and materialism are supported by
a number of legal doctrines and institutions such as freedom of contract, the right to own and
dispose of private property, and the modern business corporation. For John Paul’s criticism of
the market and the consumerist mentality see supra notes 69–89 and accompanying text.
190. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16.
191. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 51.
192. Id. para. 39.
193. Id.
194. Id. para. 36. The term appears throughout John Paul’s discussion of cultural
transformation in Centesimus Annus. See id. para. 52 (stating that fostering the standing of the
poor in the world economy “may mean making important changes in established life-styles, in
order to limit the waste of environmental and human resources, thus enabling every individual
and all the peoples of the earth to have a sufficient share of those resources”); id. para. 58
(helping the poor will require “above all a change of life-styles, of models of production and
consumption” ).
195. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36.
196. From the Church’s point of view, true ultimacy goes beyond time and consists of
participation in the life of God throughout eternity. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
§§ 1023–1029 (2d ed. 1997).
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structures will always rise to take their place as the world is always inventing
new pathologies from which it must recover. Indeed, legal solutions to social
problems will always be merely partial solutions. Legal actions will always
lack what is necessary for genuine social transformation because, in the first
instance, man is a cultural being, not a legal being. The ordering of his life de
facto precedes the ordering of his life de jure. Indeed, culture is a more
powerful force in directing the lives of individuals and groups than is law. 197
Accordingly, John Paul contends that the creation of a just society requires the
support of a culture dedicated to justice and solidarity among all people. Thus,
like Father Zosima’s guest, John Paul insists that profound social change will
not take place without a conversion of the human heart. But what, if any, role
does law have in bringing about such a change?
IV. MODESTY AND MORALISM: THE SKEEL-STUNTZ THESIS
In their recent essay, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, David
Skeel and William Stuntz argue that law, properly understood, should be
modest both in the scope of its application and in the goals that it seeks to
realize in social life.198 Echoing the thought of many others on the subject,199
Skeel and Stuntz contend that in order to be law a rule must possess certain
qualities. Indeed, the very notion of “the rule of law” holds that a legal rule
“must define the line between behavior that is subject to legal penalty and
behavior that isn’t”200 in a way that is “reasonably clear.”201 Moreover, the
rule of law demands some basic level of equality among persons in that “the
law must treat violators at least roughly the same”202 regardless of their social
or economic station in life. The requirements of equality, clarity, and
specificity help to guarantee that the application of law is not simply a matter
of “discretionary choice” on the part of officials who enforce the law.203
Indeed, Skeel and Stuntz posit that “[i]f there is one key condition that must be
satisfied for a country to call itself free, it is that no one can be thrown in

197. Here again, Karol Wojtyla’s own experiences in life—as a young man in Poland under
Nazi occupation and as a priest and bishop confronting Communism—confirmed the fact that the
coercive power of the state is unable to effect truly profound and lasting social change when a
people, bolstered by the support of an authentic culture, choose to exercise their freedom in
defiance of the ruling powers. In each case, a totalitarian regime was unable to defeat the cultural
identity, political aspirations, and moral sense of the Polish nation. For an account of Karol
Wojtyla’s experiences during these periods in Polish history, see generally WEIGEL, supra note 2.
198. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20.
199. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 184, at 270–73; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
33–94 (1969).
200. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 809.
201. Id. at 815.
202. Id. at 810.
203. Id. at 809.
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prison for no better reason than because it pleased some government official to
put him there.”204
Skeel and Stuntz find additional support for the rule of law in “an unlikely
subject: Christian theology.”205 Indeed, they conclude that the rule of law
“follows quite naturally from Christian premises.”206 For example, the idea
that the law applies equally to everyone follows from the radical equality
reflected in the biblical claim “that each of us is made in God’s image.”207
Moreover, the Bible teaches that “we are all radically imperfect,” that “the
desire for sin is woven into our very being.”208 Because everyone is “prone to
selfishness and exploitation,”209 those charged with the responsibility of
governing society cannot yield “unbounded discretion”210 and “pass
judgment”211 on others. Thus, biblical teaching provides further moral
justification for a legal system in which “[c]learly articulated rules, not jurors’
or judges’ whims [are] the basis for decisions that impose criminal or civil
liability.”212
According to Skeel and Stuntz, however, problems arise when law exceeds
its competence, when it “strays from the modest goal of resolving litigation
outcomes.”213 That is, when lawmakers believe that the primary goal of law is
to teach values, they end up enacting comprehensive moral codes. Then “the
rule of law becomes a veneer that hides the rule of discretion.”214 Indeed,
moral laws that purport to teach through the imposition of legal penalties “are
likely only to teach lessons in arbitrary government and the rule of
discretion.”215 Thus, Skeel and Stuntz conclude that “[t]he rule of law works
only if law does not seek to rule too much.”216
A particularly egregious example of law run amok can be found in what
Skeel and Stuntz refer to as “legal moralism.”217 By this they mean the
practice of enacting “purely symbolic laws”218 which lawmakers know “will
rarely be enforced.”219 As such, these sorts of measures are largely a “means
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 810.
Skeel & Skuntz, supra note 20, at 811.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 814.
Id.
Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 815.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 811.
Id.
Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 812.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 824.
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of sending messages to voters, not sending offenders to prison.”220 At the
same time, because they exist on the books, laws of this sort vest law
enforcement officials with enormous discretion. Accordingly, when they are
enforced “the message the law sends is bound to be different than the message
embodied in the relevant statute.”221
Skeel and Stuntz cite to a number of examples of the immodesty of legal
moralism, including the Mann Act, the Travel Act, the experience of state
enforced temperance under Prohibition, and the various federal bans on
narcotics and gambling,222 as well as Congress’s recent efforts to respond to
corporate mismanagement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.223 Given Skeel and
Stuntz’s professed Christianity, however, what stands out is their criticism of
legal attempts to regulate abortion.
V. LAW, CULTURE, AND THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION: A CONTEMPORARY
APPLICATION
According to Skeel and Stuntz, the “chief object” of law is not to teach but
to rule, and law rules best “when its ambitions are modest,” that is, when law is
limited to “[i]dentifying the most destructive wrongs . . . for fair, accurate
adjudication.”224 Thus, law should “draw lines not between right and wrong
but between the most destructive and verifiable wrongs, and everything
else.”225 Law must be content with “restraining the worst wrongs by the
citizenry without empowering judges and prosecutors to do wrong
themselves.”226 The “grander ambitions our law seems to have” for shaping
the moral norms that will govern social life are, in their assessment, “not
achievable.”227
Skeel and Stuntz are critical of legal efforts to restrict abortion because
they see such measures as examples of legal immodesty. The criminal
prohibitions against abortion that preceded Roe v. Wade228 were, they say,
largely symbolic laws. They did not reduce the incidence of abortion. Indeed,

220. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 825.
221. Id. at 828. In this regard Skeel and Stuntz make several pointed references to the special
counsel’s investigation of President Clinton involving Monica Lewinsky and the prosecution and
conviction of Martha Stewart for lying to federal investigators. In each case, the charge
ultimately brought was distinct from or even unrelated to the subject matter of the original
investigation. The authors see this as proof of the enormous discretion that the wide-ranging
federal criminal code affords prosecutors. See id. at 821–822, 827.
222. Id. at 825.
223. Id. at 826.
224. Id. at 830–31.
225. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 839.
226. Id. at 817.
227. Id. at 831.
228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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according to Skeel and Stuntz, “[t]he number of abortions rose steeply in the
years leading up to Roe.”229 Moreover, laws prohibiting abortion “did not
reinforce the social norm against th[e] practice.”230 Instead, Skeel and Stuntz
contend that “the norm fell apart while those bans were still in place.”231 Thus,
the law proved to be both an ineffective teacher and a poor ruler. Indeed, for
Skeel and Stuntz, the law against abortion failed to teach precisely because it
failed to rule.
As such, anti-abortion laws are, for Skeel and Stuntz, a misguided effort to
use the law as a “tool . . . for healing a spiritually diseased society.”232 With
respect to abortion, Christians, they say, should avoid the “tendency to confuse
God’s law with man’s”233 and resist the temptation “to enact their preferred
moral vision into law.”234 Plainly, “immorality and illegality cannot and must
not be coextensive.”235 Not only do such efforts to equate them undermine the
rule of law values, but Skeel and Stuntz also contend that it is “abundantly
clear that law cannot save souls.”236
A.

Abortion Restrictions: The Pursuit of Justice, Not Salvation

Skeel and Stuntz are undoubtedly correct in asserting that Christians, and
indeed people of other religious faiths, can fall into the error of “[c]onflating
God’s law and man’s law.”237 Indeed, the tendency to overreach—to use the
law to impose one’s moral vision on society as a whole—is a trait shared even
by avowed secularists and persons of no religious persuasion at all. Moreover,
Skeel and Stuntz are also plainly correct in asserting that the purpose of the
law is not to bring about some sort of spiritual healing for a troubled society.
Indeed, because the proper ambition of law is not theological in nature, the
purpose of law cannot be to “save souls.”238
Instead, the purpose of law is to achieve justice. Plainly, Skeel and Stuntz
believe that the kinds of injustice to which the law should be directed are
relatively narrow. That is, in order to guard against unfettered discretion and
preserve the rule of law, Skeel and Stuntz argue that law’s reach should exhibit
modesty by addressing only “the worst wrongs”239 that people commit. By

229. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 833 (citing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 353–55 (1991)).
230. Id. at 829.
231. Id. (citing ROSENBERG, supra note 229).
232. Id. at 837.
233. Id. at 832.
234. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 837.
235. Id. at 838.
236. Id. at 831.
237. Id. at 839.
238. Id. at 831.
239. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 817.
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identifying laws against abortion as examples of the vice of “legal moralism,”
however, Skeel and Stuntz suggest that they do not believe that justice—the
“chief object” of law240—is at stake in laws that seek to limit abortion. Indeed,
while Skeel and Stuntz obliquely suggest that women might be dissuaded from
seeking abortions if abortion opponents made use of techniques other than the
coercive force of law,241 they give no indication that they believe that the act of
abortion is itself a matter of injustice.
Here, the clear voice of John Paul II offers an indispensable perspective.
First, the Pope forthrightly reminds us of the object of abortion. That is,
abortion always involves “the deliberate and direct killing . . . of a human
being in the initial phase of his or her existence.”242 Thus, he says it is no
exaggeration to say “that we are dealing with murder” since “[t]he one
eliminated is a human being at the very beginning of life.”243 Although some
individuals who purport to speak from a Christian perspective openly dispute
these claims,244 in their essay Skeel and Stuntz do not deny the humanity of the
entity developing in the womb, nor do they deny the moral claim that such a
being has to our protection—to be free from the violent act of dismemberment
and extermination. Certainly John Paul would agree with Skeel and Stuntz that
morality and legality are not coextensive insofar as “the purpose of civil law is
different and more limited in scope than that of the moral law.”245 At the same
time, given the nature of the procedure and its ultimate end, it is difficult to
understand why Skeel and Stuntz apparently do not regard abortion as one of
“the worse wrongs,” one of “the most destructive and verifiable wrongs”246
that the law ought to address.

240. Id. at 829–30.
241. See id. at 835 (arguing that the effort expended “in trying to make the statute books
mirror the law of God . . . distracts religious believers from other, more limited efforts that might
command wide-spread support”). At a conference hosted by the Lumen Christi Institute and the
Law Professors’ Christian Fellowship that included a panel on the Skeel-Stuntz thesis, David
Skeel made clear his opposition to abortion and his support for pro-life legal efforts. While this is
surely welcome news, these views are wholly absent from Skeel and Stuntz’s article.
242. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 58.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON, OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE: TOWARD A NEW
ETHIC OF ABORTION (1983); Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Personhood, Covenant, and Abortion,
THE ANN. OF THE SOC’Y OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1983), reprinted in ABORTION AND
CATHOLICISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE 100 (Patricia Beattie Jung & Thomas A. Shannon eds.,
1988).
245. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 71. For a more complete discussion of this point
see Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., John Paul II, John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship
Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American
Pluralism, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 231, 233–43 (2004).
246. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 839.
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Second, the late Pope plainly had no illusions that the problem of abortion
could be easily solved through the machinations of law. Indeed, as noted
above, John Paul understood the priority that culture enjoys over formal norms
that govern human behavior, including law.247 Thus, he recognized that
abortion is a complex cultural phenomenon made up of a number of attitudes
and beliefs embodied in various institutions and practices. Taken together,
these attitudes and beliefs constitute a “culture of death” that is “actively
fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political currents which encourage
an idea of society excessively concerned with efficiency.”248 From this
cultural perspective any life “which would require greater acceptance, love and
care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden.”249 From this
point of view, a human being whose mere existence “compromises the wellbeing or life-style of those who are more favoured . . . [is] looked upon as an
enemy to be resisted or eliminated.”250 Thus, at the foundation of this cultural
phenomenon John Paul discerned “a completely individualistic conception of
freedom, which ends up by becoming the freedom of ‘the strong’ against the
weak.”251
This morbid culture assumes concrete form in various practices and
institutions as “actual ‘structures of sin’ which go against life”252 which
“oppose . . . human life not yet born.”253 This “conspiracy against life”
includes not only the individual choices of women and men who opt for
abortion, but also doctors and nurses who “place at the service of death skills
which were acquired for promoting life,” government officials who
“promote . . . and approve . . . abortion laws” as well as those “international
institutions, foundations and associations which systematically campaign for
the legalization and spread of abortion in the world.”254 As such, the Pope
recognized that “abortion goes beyond the responsibility of individuals and
beyond the harm done to them, and takes on a distinctly social dimension.”255
Plainly, the cultural task of responding to this vast apparatus of institutions
and beliefs and the further task of social renovation—the process of proposing
and establishing a new set of values and convictions—is beyond the limited
capacity of law to accomplish. Because the “structures of sin” that support
abortion are founded on the beliefs and attitudes of the “culture of death,”
genuine social change demands that these cultural values be confronted.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See supra Part III.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 19.
Id. para. 24.
Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para 59.
Id.
Id.
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According to John Paul, “[w]hat is urgently called for is a general mobilization
of consciences and a united ethical effort to activate a great campaign in
support of life.”256 Indeed, genuine cultural change “demands from everyone
the courage to adopt a new life-style, consisting in making practical choices—
at the personal, family, social and international level—on the basis of a correct
scale of values: the primacy of being over having, of the person over
things.”257
Accordingly, the Pope makes emphatically clear that “it is not enough to
remove unjust laws”258 that guarantee the abortion license. Beyond this, “[t]he
underlying causes of attacks on life have to be eliminated, especially by
ensuring proper support for families and motherhood.”259 Still, John Paul also
makes plain that while “laws are not the only means of protecting human
life, . . . they do play a very important and sometimes decisive role in
influencing patterns of thought and behaviour.”260 Thus, although John Paul
recognizes that the struggle against the practice of abortion is primarily a
cultural struggle, it necessarily entails a legal dimension. Indeed, given the
immensity of the problem, the “truly alarming spectacle” of “attacks on life”
that occur in an “unheard-of numerical proportion” with “widespread legal
approval and the involvement of certain sectors of health-care personnel,”261
any proposed reform of the culture must, unavoidably, engage the legal order.
Lastly, when pro-life efforts to reduce abortions do engage the legal order
they do not constitute an attempt to impose an inherently religious view of
women, or sexuality, or the developing human person on society as a whole.
To their credit Skeel and Stuntz do not derisively refer to the “Christian
Right”262 and roil against the impending establishment of an American
theocracy, as others have done.263 At the same time, they do repeatedly refer
to the problem of “[c]onflating God’s law and man’s law”264 and the “danger
in trying to make the statute books mirror the law of God.”265 Thus, while
Skeel and Stuntz’s concern is the existence of rules that vest public officials

256. Id. para. 95.
257. Id. para. 98.
258. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 90.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. para. 17.
262. They do say that “Conservative Christians could stand to learn” the lesson that good
morals often make for bad law. See Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 831.
263. See, e.g., MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN
NATIONALISM (W.W. Norton & Company 2006); CHRIS HEDGES, AMERICAN FASCISTS: THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT AND THE WAR ON AMERICA (Free Press 2006).
264. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 839.
265. Id. at 835.
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with inordinate discretion,266 their rhetoric has the whiff of an extreme and
intolerant secularism.
Although pro-life legal efforts may coincide with the moral teaching of any
number of faiths, including Christianity, the same could be said of any number
of laws including such basic crimes as those prohibiting theft and murder.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that a legal ordinance is not
constitutionally infirm under the Establishment Clause simply “because it
‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’”267
Moreover, because the justifications put forth for such laws are entirely secular
in nature they meet the requirement of “public reason” advanced by a number
of legal and political theorists.268 Indeed, as John Paul made clear, the cause of
the protection of the unborn is not an exclusively Christian concern. Although
human life “certainly has a sacred and religious value, . . . in no way is that
value a concern only of believers.”269 Indeed, because “[t]he value at stake is
one which every human being can grasp by the light of reason . . . it
necessarily concerns everyone.”270 Thus, legal efforts to restrict abortion do
not aim to “save souls” or to protect the country from damnation by a vengeful
God. Instead, properly understood, their concern is only justice in the here and
now.
B.

No Mere Symbol: The Effect of Legal Restrictions on the Incidence of
Abortion

Skeel and Stuntz are right to criticize “purely symbolic laws,”271 that is, the
practice whereby lawmakers seek to “please constituents who wish to condemn
[a certain kind of] conduct without paying either the fiscal or political price of
stopping that conduct.”272 Indeed, the act of declaring some form of behavior
to be a crime can give the appearance of taking decisive action when in fact the
measure affects nothing—a cheap salve advertised as real medicine. Although
their objection to these sorts of laws is sound, with respect to laws designed to
curtail the practice of abortion, it is sadly misplaced. These laws are not purely
symbolic. Moreover, this is true both for those laws that flatly prohibited
abortion prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,273 as

266. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
267. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 442 (1961)).
268. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 49–76
(1988); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212–54 (1993).
269. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 101.
270. Id.
271. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 828.
272. Id. at 825.
273. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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well as the more modest restrictions that the Court has since begrudgingly
allowed.
1.

The Effectiveness of Modest, Contemporary Restrictions

First, with respect to the more limited kinds of laws now in place, the
available evidence indicates that these laws have been effective in helping to
reduce the frequency of abortion. Indeed, a number of studies have concluded
that parental involvement laws and restrictions on Medicaid funding have
resulted in a lower incidence of abortion in the jurisdictions where these laws
are in place.274 As Michael New has pointed out, however, these studies have
not accounted for the fact that the lower incidence of abortion in these states
may reflect “changes in values and mores, not the legislation itself.”275 Put
another way, the declines in abortion experienced in these states may be due to
the influence of culture rather than law. Indeed, the mere fact that this sort of
legislation was enacted at all may simply reflect a change in the underlying
cultural norms.
In his own recent study, New argues that the impact of legal restrictions
can be isolated from the effect of cultural changes by comparing the
experience in states whose restrictions have been nullified by courts with the
experience of states where the restrictions have been upheld and enforced.

274. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank et al., State Abortion Rates: The Impact of Policies,
Providers, Politics, Demographics, and Economic Environment, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 513, 513–
15 (1996) (summarizing findings); Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare
When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions, 15:6 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 266 (Nov./Dec.
1983); Deborah Hass-Wilson, The Economic Impact of State Restrictions on Abortion: Parental
Consent and Notification Laws and Medicaid Funding Restrictions, 12 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 498, 509 (1993) (concluding that the rate of minors’ abortions per 1,000 teenage
pregnancies is 16% lower, and the rate of minors’ abortions per 1,000 women ages 15–19 is 25%
lower in states that have parental consent or notification laws as compared with states that do not
have these laws, and that the rate of minors’ abortions per births to teenagers is 50% lower and
the rate of minors’ abortions per women ages 15–19 is 38% lower is states that restrict Medicaid
funding compared to states that do not); Deborah Haas-Wilson, The Impact of State Abortion
Restrictions on Minors’ Demand for Abortions, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 140, 155–57 (1996)
(concluding that parental involvement statutes have decreased minors’ demand for abortion by
between 13–25% while state Medicaid funding restrictions have decreased minors’ demand for
abortion by between 9–17%); Robert L. Ohsfeldt & Stephan F. Gohmann, Do Parental
Involvement Laws Reduce Adolescent Abortion Rates?, 12 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 65, 75
(1994). But see, Deborah Haas-Wilson, Women’s Reproductive Choices: The Impact of Medicaid
Funding Restrictions, 29:5 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 228, 232 (Sept./Oct. 1997) (concluding that
Medicaid funding restrictions do not affect the abortion rate in models controlling for the
availability of abortion providers and other variables).
275. MICHAEL J. NEW, HERITAGE CTR. FOR DATA ANALYSIS, USING NATURAL
EXPERIMENTS TO ANALYZE THE IMPACT OF STATE LEGISLATION ON THE INCIDENCE OF
ABORTION 2 (2006) [hereinafter NEW, USING NATURAL EXPERIMENTS], available at
www.heritage.org/Research/Family/CDA06-01.cfm.
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That is, because “[p]resumably, all states that pass pro-life legislation [have]
undergo[ne] similar changes in values and mores” comparing “nullifiedlegislation states to enacted-legislation states effectively holds constant any
changes in values and mores.”276 From conducting this analysis, he concludes
that cultural shifts in values “have little impact on the incidence of abortion”
whereas “enacted legislation results in statistically significant reductions in
abortion rates and ratios.”277 Specifically, New finds that with respect to
informed consent laws “the abortion ratio decreases by 10.34 abortions for
every thousand live births and the abortion rate decreases by 0.86 abortions per
thousand women between the ages of 15 and 44.”278 Similarly, in the case of
parental involvement laws, New finds that “the abortion rate decreases by
16.37 abortions for every thousand live births and the abortion rate decreases
by 1.15 abortions for every thousand women” of child-bearing age.279
Moreover, in each case, the difference in the abortion rates and ratios between
the states where the legislation was nullified and where it was enforced is
statistically significant.280 As such, Skeel and Stuntz’s label of “purely
symbolic laws” is plainly inapposite.
2.

The Effectiveness of Abortion Prohibitions Prior to Legalization

Second, the degree to which the abortion restrictions in place during the
time prior to legalization were “purely symbolic laws” is the source of some
considerable debate. This debate centers around two sets of competing factual
claims. The first set of claims involves the extent to which prohibitions against
abortion were enforced by prosecutors and other officials. The second set of
claims involves estimates regarding the incidence of abortion under a legal
regime that criminally banned the procedure.
a.

The Enforcement of Abortion Prohibitions by Prosecutors and the
Medical Profession

With respect to the first set of claims, a number of proponents of abortion
contend that the laws in place prior to both Roe and the state reforms that
preceded it were, indeed, merely “symbolic” for the simple reason that they
were rarely, if ever, enforced. For example, Mark Graber has argued at length
that the criminal law of abortion involved a combination of “official

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
NEW, USING NATURAL EXPERIMENTS, supra note 275, at 5; see also MICHAEL J. NEW,
HERITAGE CTR. FOR DATA ANALYSIS, ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF STATE LEGISLATION ON THE
INCIDENCE OF ABORTION DURING THE 1990S, at 2 (2004), available at www.heritage.org/
Research/Family/CDA04-01.cfm.
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prohibition and official permissiveness”281 such that legal restrictions against
the procedure constituted a kind of institutional hypocrisy, the real effect of
which was the “discriminatory” treatment of poor women and racial
minorities.282
Notwithstanding the emphatic way in which the claim is made, a fair
reading of the available evidence simply does not support the assertion that
laws prohibiting abortion went unenforced. Indeed, at least as evidenced by
newspaper accounts and appellate decisions,283 the historical record suggests
that criminal prosecutions of abortionists were frequent, though not always
successful. Some attribute the difficulty in obtaining convictions to police and
juries drawn from a public sympathetic to the plight of women with unwanted
pregnancies and accepting of the need for abortion.284 While support for
abortion may explain the failure of some prosecutions, a more plausible
account for the pattern as a whole has to do with the nature of abortion itself
and the proof required for conviction.
That is, during the era of
criminalization, abortion was something done in secret by individuals who
deliberately sought to conceal the nature of their actions.285 Moreover, both
281. Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action, 1 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 322 (1994) [hereinafter Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past]. Graber
subsequently advanced this same thesis in book form. See MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING
ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 44–45 (1996)
[hereinafter GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION].
282. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past, supra note 281, at 337–45. For a response to
Graber’s normative claim, see Clarke D. Forsythe, The Effective Enforcement of Abortion Law
Before Roe v. Wade, in THE SILENT SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE UNBORN IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 196 (Brad Stetson ed., 1996) (noting that characterizing the effects of the law as
discriminatory “betrays the underlying presumption that abortion is a virtue and not a vice” and
that “[i]t ignores the common understanding that society does not repeal criminal laws simply
because the rich, unlike the poor, can afford the higher cost of vices caused by criminalization
itself (as with narcotics and prostitution, for example)”).
283. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 490
(2006) (noting that “[a]t best, historians and others (myself included) have only surveyed the
prosecutions that resulted in published court opinions plus occasional trial transcripts or
newspaper accounts” which means that there are undoubtedly “a large number of prosecutions
that have never been tallied in the attempt to assess the total number of prosecutions in any
century—including the twentieth”).
284. PAUL H. GEBHARD ET AL., PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND ABORTION 192 (1958) (asserting
that “defense lawyers know that their best way to win an abortion case is to secure a jury rather
than a court trial” and that “[p]olice and other officials often allow known abortionists to practice
since it is felt that there is a need for their services”); Note, A Functional Study of Existing
Abortion Laws, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 91 n.17 (1935) [hereinafter Note, A Functional Study]
(describing the unwillingness of juries to convict abortionists).
285. As Joseph Dellapenna explains:
Abortionists were careful to perform the procedure with no one in the room except the
woman undergoing the abortion (and the fetus, if one counts it as a person), so there
would be no witness but the woman herself. If the woman died, there could be no witness
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the woman and the person who performed the abortion had a keen interest in
maintaining this secrecy following the procedure, while disposing of the
remains of the aborted fetus could be accomplished with relative ease.
Accordingly, “[w]ithout witnesses or evidence, the crime would be undetected
and unpunished.”286
It was certainly the case that enforcement of the laws against abortion
varied greatly over time and across jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is also true
that “prosecutions for illegal abortions occurred in every decade in every major
metropolitan area throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
century.”287 It also appears to be the case that the lack of rigorous enforcement
in some areas was the result of official corruption.288 While the practice of
extorting money from abortion providers did take place, it did not define the
approach taken by law enforcement toward abortion in its entirety since many
arrests ultimately “resulted in convictions, an unlikely outcome if bribery were
the goal.”289
The difficulties of proof involved in obtaining abortion convictions led
prosecutors in the first half of the twentieth century to pursue those cases in
which the woman obtaining the abortion died as a result of the procedure.290
Indeed, given the difficulties described above “it is hardly surprising that
criminal prosecutions in the United States depended to a large extent on the
death bed statements of aborted women.”291 Although there is no record of a

at all. Some abortionists entered the room already masked, so even if the woman were
willing to testify, she would have difficulty identifying the abortionist. The corpus delicti,
at least early in a pregnancy, was disposed of simply through flushing a toilet.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 533 (footnote omitted).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 532; see also Note, A Functional Study, supra note 284, at 91 n.18 (setting forth
historic figures for abortion prosecutions and convictions from the attorneys general of the several
states).
288. The practice of law enforcement officers and prosecutors extorting money from
abortionists in exchange for protection from arrest and prosecution is recounted by Jerome E.
Bates. Jerome E. Bates, The Abortion Mill: An Institutional Study, 45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 157, 164–67 (1954); see also LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME:
WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973, at 155 (1997) (describing
how Chicago police officer Daniel Moriarity received regular bribes from an abortion clinic
owner and how he attempted to kill her in order to conceal his bribe-taking but mistakenly killed
her daughter instead).
289. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 545.
290. Id. at 433.
291. Id. at 534; see also id. at 433–35, 535. Leslie Reagan provides a vivid account of how,
in March of 1916, Carolina Petrovitis was coaxed into revealing the identity of her abortionist by
her physician, the hospital staff, and the police as she lay dying in a Chicago hospital. See Leslie
J. Reagan, “About to Meet Her Maker”: Women, Doctors, Dying Declarations, and the State’s
Investigation of Abortion, Chicago, 1867–1940, 77 J. AM. HIST. 1240, 1240–41 (1991)
[hereinafter Reagan, Maker].
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woman being prosecuted under a statute prohibiting abortion, as a technical
matter such women could be charged with a crime in some jurisdictions.292
This led New York to amend its laws to make clear that women who
underwent the procedure could be given immunity in exchange for testimony
against the person who performed the abortion.293 Although obtaining
convictions in abortion cases remained difficult, “police investigations . . .
could themselves be a form of punishment and a serious deterrent even if no
charges were ever brought.”294
Some jurisdictions also introduced the practice of using paid informants
who posed as women seeking abortions as a method of obtaining evidence
against illicit abortion providers.295 Although “[n]umerous convictions of
abortionists were reversed for entrapment,”296 the aggressive use of paid
investigators would seem to dispel the notion that law enforcement quietly
tolerated the practice of abortion. Indeed, it demonstrates that “police and
prosecutors were going to extraordinary lengths to detect and eliminate
abortionists.”297 What is more, the number of abortion prosecutions actually
increased in the 1950s and continued up until the time that Roe was decided.298
In addition to criminal prosecution, the laws against abortion were also
enforced indirectly through the revocation of medical licenses of those
physicians who performed abortions. Because this sort of proceeding was civil
in nature, “the finding of a violation needed only be proven by preponderance
of the evidence rather than, as in a criminal prosecution, beyond a reasonable
doubt.”299 Although the level to which these professional disciplinary actions
were effective in reducing the number of physicians from performing abortions
or curbing the incidence of abortion itself cannot be known, the fact that

292. See Forsythe, supra note 282, at 184 (stating that “there is apparently no reported
appellate decision in American history upholding the conviction of a woman for self-induced
abortion or for submitting to an abortion”); Reagan, Maker, supra note 291, at 1243–44 (stating
that “women were not arrested, prosecuted, or incarcerated for having abortions”). Forsythe also
notes that “[a]lthough there is evidence that, at common law, women were occasionally subject to
criminal prosecution for participation in abortion, the common law gave way to the pragmatic
judgments of modern abortion law that the abortionist is the most significant culprit.” Forsythe,
supra note 282, at 184. Indeed, the statutes regulating abortion in most states “expressly treated
women as the second victim of abortion.” Id.
293. Forsythe, supra note 282, at 190.
294. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 535.
295. See e.g., id. at 545 (describing the practice of using female “testers” in New York);
Forsythe, supra note 282, at 190–91 (same).
296. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 533.
297. Id.
298. See Forsythe, supra note 282, at 193–94 (listing the court decisions involving a number
of well-known abortionists in many states from the 1950s and 1960s and early 1970s).
299. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 546.
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doctors’ licenses were regularly revoked or suspended for abortion activities
cannot be seriously contested.300
Accordingly, with respect to the question of whether the laws against
abortion were the sort of “purely symbolic” laws that Skeel and Stuntz deride
cannot be answered based on the historical record. Plainly, the criminal and
civil rules against abortion did not lie dormant during the decades before state
liberalization efforts and the Court’s decision in Roe. Nevertheless, to say that
“abortion laws were regularly enforced before Roe v. Wade”301 might suggest
that enforcement was “regular” relative to the frequency of the law’s violation.
However, the incidence of abortion cannot be known with any certainty based
upon the number of criminal prosecutions and license revocations. 302 Instead,
figures for the incidence of abortion prior to legalization need to be calculated
using other methods.
b.

The Incidence of Abortion Prior to Legalization

With respect to the second set of factual claims, the way in which the issue
has been framed has been to compare the incidence of illegal abortion in the
era of criminalization with the incidence of abortion following both the
liberalization of state abortion laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. There is no dispute that abortions
took place in large numbers during the time in which states uniformly
prohibited the procedure. The question—indeed, the heart of the matter as to
whether such legal measures were “purely symbolic”—is the frequency with
which the law was violated. How common were illegal abortions during the
time before the advent of abortion reform in the states and the invalidation of
abortion restrictions under Roe? Did the frequency of abortion increase
significantly following its legalization? Or does the historical record show that

300. For a sample of appellate court decisions disposing of these professional disciplinary
matters see id. at 546 nn. 72–73 (collecting cases from several jurisdictions including New York);
Forsythe, supra note 282, at 191 n. 98 (collecting cases from New York). Leslie Reagan insists
that “[p]ublicly, the leaders of the medical profession opposed abortion; privately, many
physicians sympathized with women’s need for abortions, performed abortions, or referred
patients to midwives or physicians who performed them.” Reagan, Maker, supra note 291, at
1251. At best, this seems to be a gross overstatement given the fact that, as Dellapenna notes, in
New York the recommendation of discipline required a unanimous vote by the investigating
committee. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 547. For Dellapenna’s devastating critique of
Reagan’s claim that there was an elaborate referral network for abortions among Chicago’s most
prominent physicians see id. at 560.
301. Forsythe, supra note 282, at 180.
302. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 536 (stating that prosecution and conviction rates
are not “particularly good evidence of the rate at which abortions were being performed
illegally”). Cf. id. at 561 (“Those who insist that abortion was tolerated by law enforcement
institutions make no attempt to compare the rate of non-prosecutions for abortion against other
serious crimes that were also not always prosecuted.”).
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the large numbers of abortions performed in the wake of legislative reform and
judicial action would have taken place in any event, albeit in violation of the
law? Little or no difference between these two figures would show that the
laws in place were mostly symbolic, whereas a wide differential between them
would show the efficacy of anti-abortion legal measures.
Unfortunately, this way of framing the issue has tended not to yield
answers, only further controversy, because of the dubious nature of the
statistics that purportedly reflect the frequency of abortion during the era of
criminalization. Thus, while many commentators on the subject acknowledge
the uncertainty of abortion figures prior to legalization,303 those same
commentators often assert the validity of their own estimates with a
remarkable degree of confidence.304 Sadly, in this regard, many proponents of
legal abortion continue to cite to long-discredited estimates, 305 engaging in the

303. See Forsythe, supra note 282, at 199 n.163 (collecting quotations acknowledging the
uncertainty of estimates concerning the number of abortions prior to legalization).
304. For example, Mark Graber notes that his “conclusions are necessarily estimates because
information about abortion in the years before Roe is sketchy.” Graber, The Ghost of Abortion
Past, supra note 281, at 313 n.12. Indeed, because “[c]riminal abortionists did not keep detailed
records” of their work, Graber cautions that “scholars must rely on more speculative means for
determining the extent, bias, and consequences of abortion underground.” Id. Yet three pages
later, Graber confidently asserts that “[s]cholars estimate that one out of every three to five
pregnancies in the United States was aborted during the first seventy years of the twentieth
century” and, further, that “[s]ome public health specialists suggest that as many as two to three
million abortions were performed annually in the United States” during this time. Id. at 316–17.
305. For example, in 1955 Planned Parenthood’s medical director, Mary S. Calderone,
organized a conference in New York entitled “Abortion in the United States.” See DAVID J.
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V.
WADE 275–76 (1994). The papers presented at this conference were subsequently published in a
volume edited by Calderone. ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (Mary Steichen Calderone ed.,
1958) [hereinafter ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES]. One paper, authored by a Statistics
Committee charged with assessing the frequency of abortion and composed of Christopher
Tietze, Paul Gebhard, Alan Guttmacher, P.K. Whelpton, Carl Erhardt, and Irene Taeuber, stated
that plausible estimates of induced abortion could be as low as 200,000 or as high as 1.2 million
per year. Id. at 180. The Committee concluded, however, that “[t]here is no objective basis for
the selection of a particular figure between these two estimates as an approximation of the actual
frequency.” Id.
Despite this overt lack of confidence by the authors of the report, proponents of abortion
have routinely cited the 1.2 million figure as if it were an undisputed fact rather than a dubious
estimate. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 41 (1990)
(stating that “[b]y the late 1960s as many as 1,200,000 women were undergoing illegal abortions
each year”). In support of this claim, Tribe cites JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900, at 254 (1978) (“By the late 1960s
estimates of the number of illegal abortions performed in the United States each year ranged from
200,000 to 1,200,000.”), who in turn cites N.Y. GOVERNOR’S SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW
THE STATE’S ABORTION LAWS, REPORT 15 (1968). Governor Nelson Rockefeller created the socalled “Froesel Commission” because of the perceived need to generate additional legislative
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conceit that these figures are not in dispute. These authors are either oblivious
to the fact that these studies have been dismissed or they simply choose to
continue to cite these works because it appears to suit their argument.306

support for abortion reform. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 628; GARROW, supra, at 345–
47. The Commission, whose members included Alan Guttmacher, Christopher Tietze, and Cyril
Means, relied upon the Statistics Committee paper in the published volume of the proceedings of
the 1955 Planned Parenthood conference. See GARROW, supra, at 346. Thus, notwithstanding
the Committee’s warning that there was “no objective basis” for selecting any number within the
range, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 180, many advocates of abortion have
persisted in anointing the 1.2 million figure as the truth. See, e.g., CAROLE JOFFE, DOCTORS OF
CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE 29
(1995) (citing 1.2 million figure). Significantly, the 1.2 million, figure cited by the 1955 Planned
Parenthood conference, that has been so enthusiastically embraced by abortion supporters, is
itself derived from the much discredited Kinsey materials. See GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION:
THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES AND THE ARGUMENTS 40 (1970); see also infra note 306.
306. For example, in support of his statement that “[s]cholars estimate that one out of every
three to five pregnancies in the United States was aborted during the first seventy years of the
twentieth century,” Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past, supra note 281, at 316, Mark Graber in
part cites to a study published by the Alfred C. Kinsey Institute for Sex Research. See id. at 316
n.27 (citing GEBHARD et al., supra note 284 , at 93–94). Graber seems not to know, or chooses to
ignore, the many severe criticisms leveled against this study for, among other things, the
unrepresentative nature of the women surveyed. See, e.g., GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 39.
Indeed, the Kinsey study has been criticized as unreliable even by ardent supporters of the
abortion license. The Statistics Committee of the 1955 Planned Parenthood conference
concluded that the data in the Kinsey report did “not provide an adequate basis for reliable
estimates of the incidence of induced abortion in the urban white population of the United States,
much less in the total population.” ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 305, at 179;
see also DANIEL CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 135–36 (1970)
(commenting that a number of studies, including those by Kinsey and Gebhard, “did not have
representative population samples, and yet their figures were used to provide the basis for the
high estimates”); Robert G. Potter, Jr., Abortion in the United States, 37 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 92, 94 (1959) (book review) (observing that Christopher Tietze contends that the Kinsey
survey respondents are usefully representative but that “his tables contradict this conclusion by
showing not only gross differences with respect to age, education, and marital status, but also,
and more important, tangible differences with respect to age-specific marital fertility”). These
severe criticisms notwithstanding, Graber’s article would have the reader believe that the Kinsey
report’s findings have gone unchallenged.
Although Graber seems to want to make amends for this omission in his book, his effort
falls short. He notes that the Kinsey study has been criticized because the women surveyed did
not include representative numbers of urban dwellers, minority women, and unmarried women.
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 281, at 165 n.42. Graber trumpets the fact that this
criticism is heard from “opponents of legal abortion.” Id. He again fails to note, however, that
this same criticism is voiced by the supporters of legal abortion as well. See, e.g., ABORTION IN
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 305, at 178 (concluding that the women surveyed in the Kinsey
materials “do not constitute a representative sample of the population of the United States”);
CALLAHAN, supra. What is more, Graber contends that this weakness is in fact a strength. He
argues that the under-representation of these groups of women indicates that the Kinsey study
likely understates the actual incidence of abortion prior to legalization because “[p]ersons of
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To their credit, some writers on the subject have recognized the tendency
of certain authors to favor estimates which in turn favor the author’s own
moral and legal predilections with respect to the issue.307 Given the widely
shared view that firm numbers reflecting the era of criminalization are hard to
come by, it is difficult to disagree with Joseph Dellapenna’s statement that
“[a]ny estimate of the incidence of illegal abortion must remain largely a
guess.”308 At the same time, it is undoubtedly the case that some guesses are
better than others.
In support of their contention that anti-abortion laws were ineffective and
so merely symbolic, Skeel and Stuntz rely almost entirely on one source,

color, urban dwellers, and unmarried women . . . have much higher illegal abortion rates than the
women Kinsey surveyed.” GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 281, at 165 n.42. Here
again, however, Graber appears to miss the main criticism concerning the unrepresentative nature
of the Kinsey study, namely the fact that the women surveyed were not drawn from a random
sample. Indeed, these women were self-selected in that they had “some interest in, and
comprehended the value of, sex research.” GEBHARD et al., supra note 284, at 14. This likely
had “the greatest effect on the validity not only of this study but of all the Kinsey material.”
GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 39.
Similarly, historian James Mohr cites to Frederick Taussig’s work, “a classic study
published in 1936” in which he estimated “that over half a million illegal abortions were then
taking place in the United States annually.” MOHR, supra note 305, at 254. In fact, Taussig
estimated that some 681,600 abortions took place throughout the country each year. See
FREDERICK J. TAUSSIG, ABORTION: SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL
ASPECTS 28 (1936). Mohr does not consider the critique of Taussig’s study based on the fact that
the bulk of his data is derived from case histories of patients at a New York birth control clinic
reported in MARIE E. KOPP, BIRTH CONTROL PRACTICE (1934). He does not pause to consider
how such data might diverge significantly from the population as a whole. Nor does Mohr bother
to consider how Taussig’s data for rural areas might be flawed given that it was based on
questionnaires sent to Iowa physicians who were simply asked to give “their estimate” as to the
frequency of the practice. See GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 35–36. What is worse, Mohr does not
consider the fact that in 1944 Taussig repudiated his estimate of 681,800 annual abortions as far
too high. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 537 (citing Statement of Dr. Frederick Taussig,
NAT. COMM. ON MATERNAL HEALTH, THE ABORTION PROBLEM 28 (1944)). Perhaps the
effusive praise of Taussig’s work offered by the author of a law review comment who did not
have the benefit of this criticism can be forgiven, see Comment, A Medicolegal Analysis of
Abortion Statutes, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 181 n.1 (1958) (stating that Taussig’s work should be
“required reading” for legislators), but this is hardly an excuse for a professional historian like
Mohr or more recent commentators who continue to rely on Taussig’s repudiated figure. See
DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 537 n.423 (citing additional examples).
307. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557 (“The larger estimates have found an audience
among those who favored the legalization of abortion as it allows them to claim that the abortion
laws were a failure and therefore should have been repealed.”); GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 41
(“One opposed to legalized abortion naturally would like to minimize the dimensions of the
problem.”).
308. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557.
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namely, Gerald Rosenberg’s book The Hollow Hope.309 Indeed, they cite
Rosenberg for the proposition that “[c]ommon estimates of the number of
illegal abortions during the 1960s . . . range from 500,000 to 1.5 million.”310
For his part, Rosenberg acknowledges that “illegal abortions are impossible to
count accurately” such that “[f]or obvious reasons of partisanship and lack of
hard data” the proffered figures for illegal abortions “can only be taken as very
rough estimates.”311 Although he further cautions that “one should approach
estimates of the number of illegal abortions with care,” in the next breath he
concludes that “the 1 million figure is probably not a grossly unreasonable
estimate.”312 Likewise, in another article, Stuntz contends that “[b]y most

309. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 173–201, 353–55 (1991).
310. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 829 n.46 (citing ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 353–
55 & tbl.A1).
311. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 353.
312. Id. at 355. There are a number reasons to criticize Rosenberg’s analysis of the issue
regarding the annual number of abortions that took place prior to legalization. First, Rosenberg
treats all of the estimates he draws upon as empirical studies of the issue. This, however, is
plainly not the case. Indeed, some of the sources he cites are merely duplicative of one another.
That is, they repeat the same figures, but these figures represent only one empirical study. For
example, Rosenberg cites to Taussig, see TAUSSIG supra note 306, and the Kinsey materials, see
GEBHARD ET AL., supra note 284, and then to a law review article as if it were an independent
source. See ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 354 tbl.A1 (citing Zad Leavy & Jerome M. Kummer,
Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (1962)). In
fact, however, this article simply relies on Taussig’s study and the Kinsey materials. See Leavy
& Kummer, supra, at 123–24. Rosenberg also has the audacity to cite to a sponsor’s statement by
Senator Robert Packwood introducing abortion reform legislation in the Senate. ROSENBERG,
supra note 309, at 354 tbl.A1 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 12673 (1970) (statement of Sen.
Packwood)). Rosenberg would have the reader believe that Packwood’s statement should be
treated as a serious, independent authority. In fact, however, Packwood conducted no
independent research in support of the figures he advances. He merely repeats the 1 million
abortions per year figure which he obtained from another source. The same could be said of
Rosenberg’s citations to articles in the New York Times, the New Republic, and Newsweek.
ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 354 tbl.A1.
Perhaps even more troubling is that Rosenberg fails to cite to a number of authorities that
do genuinely set forth independent research. What is apparent about each of these studies is that
they do not favor Rosenberg’s preferred number of 1 million abortions per year. These sources
include James R. Abernathy, Bernard G. Greenberg & Daniel G. Horvitz, Estimates of Induced
Abortion in Urban North Carolina, 7 DEMOGRAPHY 19, 29 (1970) (study which extrapolates out
to about 829,000 abortions per year nationally) and Barbara J. Syska, Thomas W. Hilgers &
Dennis O'Hare, An Objective Model for Estimating Criminal Abortions and Its Implications for
Public Policy, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 171 (Thomas W. Hilgers, Dennis J.
Horan & David Mall eds., 1981) (using maternal mortality rates due to criminal abortion and
natural pregnancy to estimate that between 39,000-210,000 abortions took place annually prior to
legalization).
The study by Syska, Hilgers, and O’Hare poses an especially serious challenge to the 1
million illegal abortions per year figure championed by Rosenberg and others. In it, the authors
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use the number of maternal deaths due to criminal abortion, the maternal death rate due to natural
pregnancy, and the degree to which criminal abortion is more dangerous than natural pregnancy
to predict the number of illegal abortions for a given year. See id.; see also generally Brian W.
Clowes, The Role of Maternal Deaths in the Abortion Debate, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327
(1993) (demonstrating the use of greatly exaggerated maternal death figures by abortion
proponents in the abortion debate).
To his credit, Mark Graber at least recognizes this challenge. His response, however,
leaves something to be desired. Indeed, Graber seems not to fully comprehend the implications
of the model Syska and her colleagues put forth. Thus, Graber offers several superficial
criticisms of Syska, Hilgers, and O’Hare’s study. For example, he tries to make a virtue out of
the fact that pro-choice advocates have ignored the Syska study in asserting that “no article
published after 1960 in a respectable medical, public health, or scientific journal supports the
claim of pro-life advocates that less than 200,000 abortions were being performed annually in the
United States during the period when abortion was illegal.” GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION,
supra note 281 at 23. Instead, Graber says that “[t]he most reliable studies” support the figure of
1 million abortions per year. Id. This, of course, is not an argument in favor of these other
studies, merely a rhetorical assertion on Graber’s part. He does not present any reasons for
having confidence in their reliability, only his commendation that they are so.
More importantly, Graber criticizes the Syska study for “calculat[ing] the relative risk of
the average criminal abortion by using a survey of ‘the nonwhite population of New York City.’”
Id. It is wrong, he says, to assume “that black women in Harlem had access to anything remotely
resembling the same quality abortion services as had white women who lived in such affluent
suburbs as Scarsdale and Great Neck.” Id. What Graber fails to mention, however, is that Syska
and her co-authors explicitly make note of this very limitation themselves. See Syska et al.,
supra, at 170–71. What is more, they also note that when “applied on a national basis” this has
the effect of “artificially inflat[ing the] estimate of criminal abortions,” id. at 170, a point that
seems to have escaped Graber’s attention. Indeed, the Syska study makes different predictions
regarding the frequency of illegal abortion based on different assumptions that the procedure was
either three, five, ten, or fifteen times more dangerous than carrying a pregnancy to term.
Here Graber fails to recognize the power of the model put forth by Syska and her coauthors as it relates to other literature on the subject. That is, even if the risk of maternal death
due to illegal abortion was only twice as great as carrying a pregnancy to term, rather than three
or five or ten times more dangerous, as the Syska study hypothesizes, the annual number of
illegal abortions is still far below the 1 million per year figure that Graber champions. See
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 282, at 42, n.19. For example, for the year 1967,
Syska and her co-authors estimate that 135,000 criminal abortions took place based on the
assumption that the risk of maternal death is five times greater in the case of criminal abortion
than in the case of natural pregnancy. Syska et al., supra, at 168. If the same statistics are used
but it is assumed that criminal abortion was only three times more dangerous than carrying a
pregnancy to term, then the Syska study predicts that 225,000 abortions took place that year. Id.
at 168 tbl.3. If instead it is assumed that criminal abortion was only twice as dangerous as natural
pregnancy, then the formula yields a figure of 337,500 abortions. If it is assumed that criminal
abortion was no more dangerous than carrying the pregnancy to term, then the formula yields a
figure of 675,000 abortions for 1967. While these numbers are substantial, they are on the lower
end of the 200,000 to 1.2 million range put forth at the famous Planned Parenthood conference in
1955. See ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 305, at 180. More importantly, these
figures are far below the 1 million abortions per year that Graber, Rosenberg, and many others
(including by extension Skeel and Stuntz) tout as authoritative. The point is that, if these
numbers are correct—and Graber offers no sound reason why they should not be regarded as
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estimates, there were about a million illegal abortions per year during the
1960s.”313 Here again, his sole authority for this figure is Rosenberg.314
Rosenberg provides a useful table that makes use of the annual abortion
totals compiled by the Guttmacher Institute.315 It shows that the number of
legal abortions rose from 22,700 in 1969 to 193,500 in 1970, to 485,800 in
1971, 586,800 in 1972, and 744,600 in 1973, the year Roe was decided.316
Likewise, he notes that legal abortions did not exceed 1 million per year until
1975, reaching nearly 1.6 million abortions in 1985.317 For Rosenberg it is
significant that “[t]here was no steep or unusual increase in the number of legal
abortions following Roe” and that “[w]hile the increases were large and steady,
they were smaller than those of previous years.”318 Thus, Rosenberg
emphasizes that “the largest increase in the number of legal abortions
occur[red] between 1970 and 1971, two years before Roe.”319
This pattern of increase fits the thesis that Rosenberg seeks to advance in
his book, namely that judicial action has not been quite as decisive in bringing
about social change as others have opined.320 This pattern does not, however,
lend support to Skeel and Stuntz’s thesis concerning the inability of law in
general to help bring about social change. Indeed, it undermines Skeel and
Stuntz’s claim regarding the impotence of law. Thus, although Skeel and
Stuntz join with Rosenberg in observing that the number of abortions “rose
steeply in the years leading up to Roe”321 they fail to mention the well-known
historical reason that accounts for this change, namely the fact that between

such—then it is plainly the case that the law prohibiting abortion was not “purely symbolic.”
Indeed, it had an enormous influence on the frequency with which abortions were sought and
obtained.
313. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1886 (2000).
314. Id. (citing ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 353–55 & tbl.A1).
315. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 180 tbl.6.1.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 179.
319. Id. at 178. To further stress the increase in abortion prior to Roe, Rosenberg analyzes the
data in two and three year blocks:
The largest increase over a two-year period is in 1969–71 with an increase of 463,100
legal abortions. Next is 1970–72 with 393,300, about 26 percent higher than the 1972–74
increase of 311,800. The 1971–73 increase is only 258,800. Even the 1973–75 increase
is only 289,600. The largest increase over three years comes in the pre-Roe 1969–72
period where there were an additional 564,100 legal abortions. The 1972–75 period saw
an increase of 447,400 legal abortions, and between 1973 and 1976 the increase was
434,700.
Id. at 179.
320. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 1–8.
321. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 833.
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1966 and 1971 seventeen states either repealed or substantially liberalized their
abortion statutes.322
The “large and steady” increases witnessed in this period do not support
the larger estimates of illegal abortions prior to Roe. As noted above,
Rosenberg—and with him Skeel and Stuntz—contends that 1 million abortions
took place annually prior to both Roe and the legislative reforms that preceded
it. Yet, as Joseph Dellapenna observes, “[l]egal abortions did not reach
1,000,000 until 1975—two full years after Roe and eight years after the first
reform of the abortion statutes,” 323 a point with which Rosenberg agrees.324
Thus, as large as the increases recounted above were, one would have expected
them to have been even larger if the true level of illegal abortions had been
toward the high end of the 200,000 to 1.2 million range that many proponents
of abortion suggest and which Rosenberg and Skeel and Stuntz endorse.
Indeed, Dellapenna concludes that “[a]ll of this seems to point towards the
low-end estimates, without, of course, giving us anything like a precise
figure.”325

322. The Roe court itself noted that in “the past several years” prior to its decision there was
“a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes” resulting in “less stringent laws, most of them
patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, § 230.3.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973).
For a summary of the various state laws in place at the time Roe was decided as well as citation to
these authorities, see Paul Benjamin Linton, Enforcement of State Abortion Statutes After Roe: A
State-by-State Analysis, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 157, 158–61, 258 (1990).
In another chapter of his book, Rosenberg makes clear the legislative and political
changes that took place during this time, though he does not explicitly correlate these changes to
the increases in the incidence of abortion noted earlier. See ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 258–
65. While the fact that these legislative developments led to an increase in the incidence of
growth in abortion supports Rosenberg’s narrow thesis that courts were not solely or even
primarily responsible for this change in the social order, it pointedly undermines Skeel and
Stuntz’s broader thesis that, in the case of abortion, law generally is unable to bring about
substantial change in social practices. That is, even if the figure of 1 million abortions per year
before the state reforms were enacted is conceded, the jump to nearly 1.6 million abortions in
1985 which Rosenberg reports must be reckoned as substantial in anyone’s estimation.
323. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557.
324. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 180 tbl.6.1.
325. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557. The relatively slow growth in the annual number
of abortions following legalization is even more pronounced if one makes use of the abortion
statistics compiled by the Centers for Disease Control, as Dellapenna does, rather than the figures
generated by the Guttmacher Institute, the research arm of Planned Parenthood, which Rosenberg
employs. Thus, for example, whereas the Guttmacher Institute reported that 744,600 legal
abortions took place in 1973 and 898,600 in 1974, the CDC reported that 615,813 and 763,476
legal abortions took place respectively for these same years. Compare Lawrence B. Finer &
Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 6, 8 tbl.1 (Jan./Feb. 2003) with Lilo T. Strauss et al., Ctr. for
Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Abortion Surveillance—
United States, 2003, 55 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1, 16 tbl.2 (2006),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5511.pdf. The difference lies in the use of
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More importantly, if this is correct—if the number of illegal abortions was
well below the 1 million per year figure advanced by Rosenberg, and by
extension Skeel and Stuntz—then the law that prohibited the practice of
abortion prior to Roe was not merely symbolic. Indeed, this would suggest that
it had a profound influence on the behavior of women and men with respect to
the decision to terminate or sustain nascent human life. Put another way, if as
Skeel and Stuntz suggest, the law prohibiting abortion was only symbolic and
so had no effect in curbing its incidence, then one would not have expected the
annual number of abortions to rise from the inflated pre-legalization estimate
of 1.2 million advanced by abortion advocates326 to almost 1.6 million in 1985,
an increase of nearly one-third. Indeed, if the law was of no effect, then one
would not have expected the annual number of abortions to more than double
from 744,600 in 1973 to nearly 1.5 million in 1979.327 If the law is incapable
of promoting profound cultural change, if the law truly is modest in what it can
hope to achieve, then the 1 million per year figure prior to legalization that
Skeel and Stuntz endorse should have remained fairly constant. Instead the
data shows that from 1975 to 1985 the incidence of abortion increased by
almost sixty percent.328
C. The Law as Teacher: Beyond Simple Enforcement
The lesson that should be learned from this historical experience of
enormous change is a deeper appreciation for the teaching function that law
performs. The absence of legal restriction helped to usher in this change. It
helped to give birth to a culture in which abortion is practiced with alarming
regularity.329 Indeed, a legal regime that recognized abortion as a civil and
constitutional right served as the midwife for a “culture of death.”330 The law
did not create the demand for abortion. The desire on the part of some women
to be rid of unwanted pregnancies existed long before Roe was decided and
different methods of data collection. The CDC only reports figures that it actually receives from
the central health authorities for each of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia and New
York City. See Strauss, et al., supra, at 1–3, 8. By contrast, the Guttmacher Institute directly
contacts (with a mailed questionnaire) the abortion providers that it identifies. For those
providers that fail to respond to either its mailings or subsequent efforts at contact, the
Guttmacher Institute uses the numbers reported to the various state health authorities. Where
such figures are not available, however, the Guttmacher Institute employs its own estimates. See
Finer & Henshaw, supra, at 6–9.
326. For a discussion regarding the origins of this dubious figure and its popularity among
abortion advocates, see supra note 305.
327. See Finer & Henshaw, supra note 325, at 8 tbl.1 (reporting 1,497,700 abortions for
1979).
328. Id. (reporting that abortions rose from 1.034 million in 1975 to 1.588 million in 1985).
329. For the twenty-eight years of legal abortion summarized in Finer and Henshaw’s study,
on average 27 percent of all pregnancies in America have ended in abortion. Id.
330. See supra notes 242–61 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

370

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:317

will undoubtedly continue to exist in some form in the future. But the law did
legitimize this desire, and made its realization far easier to obtain. By cloaking
abortion in the aura of respectability, the law transformed abortion from a
clandestine practice that was publicly derided to one that was openly practiced
and widely supported. The cultural message transmitted by this change in
legal status could not help but alter the frequency of the practice.
Indeed, the steady growth of abortion following legalization recounted
above does more than call into question the exaggerated number of abortions
that purportedly took place during the era of criminalization. It also
demonstrates the power of law’s teaching function. That is, the reason why the
number of abortions in the United States did not rise to 1 million per year until
1975 is not only because the figure of 1 million per year prior to Roe was false.
The reason this level was not achieved until two full years after Roe was
decided and eight years after states began to adopt more liberal abortion
statutes is that education takes time. During this time, during the period of
clamoring for the repeal of restrictions and indeed the constitutionalization of
abortion on demand, women learned the lesson being taught by the law, the
media,331 and through other venues of cultural expression. They learned that
the public approved of abortion—that abortion was no longer to be seen as an
action worthy of condemnation but as a legitimate exercise of one’s inalienable
freedom. American women learned the lesson of cultural approval and so
practiced abortion in far greater numbers than they did before legalization.
Skeel and Stuntz do not entirely reject the notion of the law as teacher, but
they severely limit it. Thus, they concede that “[l]aw can indeed teach, but
only when its chief object lies elsewhere,”332 namely when it pursues justice

331. For example, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the NEW YORK TIMES was an early and
enthusiastic supporter, first of abortion reform, then repeal, and then the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe v. Wade. See GARROW, supra note 305, at 298–317, 345–47, 357–58, 605–08
(also describing the news coverage and editorial positions of other media publications). This
institutional bias in favor of the freedom to abort clearly persists to this day. See, e.g., DEANA
ROHLINGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY, COUNTERMOVEMENT AND MEDIA
COVERAGE OUTCOMES: A CASE STUDY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 17 (2001) (concluding from
a survey of media reporting that “it is apparent that pro-choice organizations were mentioned
more often than pro-life organizations”), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/01-06;
Maryann Barakso & Brian F. Schaffner, Winning Coverage: News Media Portrayals of the
Women’s Movement, 1969–2004, 11 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 22, 36 (2006) (finding an
overrepresentation of the abortion issue in coverage of women’s issues and remarking that “it is
not surprising to find women’s movement organizations frequently winning coverage on the issue
on television newscasts”); David Shaw, Abortion Foes Stereotyped, Some in the Media Believe:
Abortion and the Media, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1990, at A20. For a recent, specific example of how
the institutional bias against the pro-life message precludes some media sources from employing
certain language in its reporting, see Kenneth L. Woodward, What’s In a Name? The New York
Times On “Partial-Birth” Abortion, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 427 (2005).
332. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 830.
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through the enforcement of specific ordinances.333 Thus, for Skeel and Stuntz,
law teaches best when it rules modestly, when it “does not seek to rule too
much,”334 when it does not “cover . . . too much territory.”335 Indeed, if we are
to avoid the pitfall of excessive governmental discretion and “recover the rule
of law,” they assure us that “it must be a more modest law that rules.”336
Skeel and Stuntz are not wrong to insist that law teaches best when its
lessons are learned through enforcement, but law’s ability to teach goes
beyond this. The abortion laws in place prior to Roe served as an imperfect
though still effective teacher, reminding women and men of both the gravity of
the act of abortion and its lethal and irreversible consequences. They
reaffirmed the life-nurturing values already present in American society and so
encouraged people to do what they already knew to be right.
Plainly, not everyone listened to this message nor was every illegal
abortion that did take place subject to criminal prosecution. The evidence
indicates, however, that the abortion laws in place prior to Roe “effectively
inhibited the performance of abortions”337 even when such laws were not
properly enforced in every instance. Indeed, the law in place at that time
plainly influenced the cultural outlook of society in a way that was reflected in
the actions of American women. Put another way, the enormous difference
between the likely incidence of abortion prior to the liberalization of abortion
laws by the states in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the staggering
frequency of abortion following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade
shows that law’s teaching function goes beyond the concrete application of a
statute in particular cases of enforcement. This is a lesson that John Paul well
knew and which Skeel and Stuntz would do well to remember.
CONCLUSION
In ordering the day-to-day affairs of most people within a given society,
culture is indeed vastly more important than law. Indeed, culture enjoys a kind
priority over law insofar as all law is generated and exists within a given
culture. At the same time, law also influences the development of culture
through its effect on the behavior and beliefs of the individuals subject to it.
Because John Paul II understood this vital relationship, he recognized that the
legal prohibition of unjust actions is never sufficient to remove the “structures
of sin” that sometimes dominate society. Instead, he understood that “[t]he
changing of laws must be preceded and accompanied by the changing of

333. Id. (referring, with respect to the enforcement of civil rights laws, to “direct, tangible
consequences that [do] not depend on discretionary decisions” of government officials).
334. Id. at 811.
335. Id. at 819.
336. Id. at 813.
337. Forsythe, supra note 282, at 180.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

372

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:317

mentalities and morals.”338 That is, because culture enjoys a kind of priority
over law, legal change can greatly contribute to the process of cultural
renovation, but law can never be a substitute for it.
In arguing on behalf of “legal modesty” from a Christian perspective,
David Skeel and William Stuntz seem both to agree with Pope John Paul and
to appreciate law’s limits. Indeed, they recognize that when the subject matter
of a legal rule exceeds law’s ability to regulate, it may in fact undermine the
rule of law by vesting inordinate discretion in public officials. Thus, they
argue that lawmakers should refrain from engaging in “legal moralism” by
enacting “purely symbolic laws” intended more as a means of political
expression than as a mechanism for the enforcement of basic standards of
conduct.
Although examples of legal moralism clearly exist, Skeel and Stuntz
incorrectly place laws regulating abortion in this category of legal excess. This
unfortunate move constitutes a significant departure from both the teaching of
John Paul II and the wider Christian tradition. Indeed, this wider tradition, as
reflected in the magisterium of the late Pope, recognizes that law can indeed
teach beyond the particular instances in which a specific ordinance is enforced.
That is, unlike Skeel and Stuntz, John Paul recognized the “sometimes decisive
role” that law plays “in influencing patterns of thought and behaviour”339 even
when the law is not enforced with perfect regularity.
This decisive role that law can play in the culture of a society is reflected
in the historical record concerning the legal regulation of abortion in the
United States prior to state efforts at liberalization and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Roe v. Wade. Unfortunately, Skeel and Stuntz ignore the
substantial literature on this subject. Instead they rely upon a single empirical
source in a facile and uncritical manner. A more thorough review of the
available evidence indicates that, although abortion was widely practiced
during this time, the subsequent legalization of the procedure multiplied the
incidence of abortion several fold.340
Accordingly, Skeel and Stuntz fail to demonstrate that the laws prohibiting
abortion prior to the current era of legalization were either purely symbolic or
immodest. Laws that restrict abortion are indeed modest insofar as they seek
to protect the lives of unborn human beings—a point that John Paul repeatedly
emphasized and upon which Skeel and Stuntz are conspicuously silent.

338. Pope John Paul II, Address at the Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the
Encyclical “Evangelium Vitae,” para. 9 (Feb. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Fifth Anniversary Address],
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_
20000214_acd-life_en.html.
339. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 90.
340. See, e.g., DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 701 (stating that legalization likely increased
the incidence of abortion “between two and three times”).
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The incalculable worth of every human being was always foremost in the
mind of Pope John Paul II. Indeed, the dignity of the human person was at the
center of his service as Peter’s successor.341 Although he was not a lawyer, as
Pope he made a substantial contribution to the proper understanding of law and
its limits. John Paul knew that law had a crucial role to play in combating the
“structures of sin” and securing the dignity of every human being. At the same
time, he knew that law is derivative of culture and that it is primarily through
culture that men and women find the answers to life’s questions. Although
justice is the measure of both law’s modesty and law’s ambition, the human
heart’s desire for justice exceeds law’s ability to control. Thus, like Father
Zosima, John Paul taught that justice will take root only when we come to
recognize that “every one of us is answerable for everyone else.”342 The
witness that Karol Wojtyla bore to this truth in his teaching and in his life is
something for which his pontificate will long be remembered. Indeed, it is
something for which the entire human family should be grateful.

341. Fifth Anniversary Address, supra note 338, para. 1 (John Paul states that he considers
the document Evangelium Vitae to be “central to the whole Magisterium of my Pontificate”).
342. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 359.
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